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Abstract
Randomized algorithms are often enjoyed for their simplicity, but the hash functions used
to yield the desired theoretical guarantees are often neither simple nor practical. Here we show
that the simplest possible tabulation hashing provides unexpectedly strong guarantees.
The scheme itself dates back to Carter and Wegman (STOC’77). Keys are viewed as consist-
ing of c characters. We initialize c tables T1, . . . , Tc mapping characters to random hash codes.
A key x = (x1, . . . , xc) is hashed to T1[x1]⊕ · · · ⊕ Tc[xc], where ⊕ denotes xor.
While this scheme is not even 4-independent, we show that it provides many of the guarantees
that are normally obtained via higher independence, e.g., Chernoff-type concentration, min-wise
hashing for estimating set intersection, and cuckoo hashing.
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1 Introduction
An important target of the analysis of algorithms is to determine whether there exist practical
schemes, which enjoy mathematical guarantees on performance.
Hashing and hash tables are one of the most common inner loops in real-world computation, and
are even built-in “unit cost” operations in high level programming languages that offer associative
arrays. Often, these inner loops dominate the overall computation time. Knuth gave birth to
the analysis of algorithms in 1963 [Knu63] when he analyzed linear probing, the most popular
practical implementation of hash tables. Assuming a perfectly random hash function, he bounded
the expected number of probes. However, we do not have perfectly random hash functions. The
approach of algorithms analysis is to understand when simple and practical hash functions work
well. The most popular multiplication-based hashing schemes maintain the O(1) running times
when the sequence of operations has sufficient randomness [MV08]. However, they fail badly even
for very simple input structures like an interval of consecutive keys [PPR09, PT10, TZ09], giving
linear probing an undeserved reputation of being non-robust.
On the other hand, the approach of algorithm design (which may still have a strong element
of analysis) is to construct (more complicated) hash functions providing the desired mathemati-
cal properties. This is usually done in the influential k-independence paradigm of Wegman and
Carter [WC81]. It is known that 5-independence is sufficient [PPR09] and necessary [PT10] for lin-
ear probing. Then one can use the best available implementation of 5-independent hash functions,
the tabulation-based method of [TZ04,TZ09].
Here we analyze simple tabulation hashing. This scheme views a key x as a vector of c characters
x1, . . . , xc. For each character position, we initialize a totally random table Ti, and then use the
hash function
h(x) = T1[x1]⊕ · · · ⊕ Tc[xc].
This is a well-known scheme dating back at least to Wegman and Carter [WC81]. From a practical
view-point, tables Ti can be small enough to fit in fast cache, and the function is probably the
easiest to implement beyond the bare multiplication. However, the scheme is only 3-independent,
and was therefore assumed to have weak mathematical properties. We note that if the keys are
drawn from a universe of size u, and hash values are machine words, the space required is O(cu1/c)
words. The idea is to make this fit in fast cache. We also note that the hash values are bit strings,
so when we hash into bins, the number of bins is generally understood to be a power of two.
The challenge in analyzing simple tabulation is the significant dependence between keys. Nev-
ertheless, we show that the scheme works in some of the most important randomized algorithms,
including linear probing and several instances when Ω(lg n)-independence was previously needed.
We confirm our findings by experiments: simple tabulation is competitive with just one 64-bit
multiplication, and the hidden constants in the analysis appear to be very acceptable in practice.
In many cases, our analysis gives the first provably good implementation of an algorithm which
matches the algorithm’s conceptual simplicity if one ignores hashing.
Desirable properties. We will focus on the following popular properties of truly random hash
functions.
• The worst-case query time of chaining is O(lg n/ lg lg n) with high probability (w.h.p.). More
generally, when distributing balls into bins, the bin load obeys Chernoff bounds.
• Linear probing runs in expected O(1) time per operation. Variance and all constant moments
are also O(1).
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• Cuckoo hashing: Given two tables of size m ≥ (1 + ε)n, it is possible to place a ball in one of
two randomly chosen locations without any collision, with probability 1−O( 1n).
• Given two sets A,B, we have Prh[minh(A) = minh(B)] = |A∩B||A∪B| . This can be used to quickly
estimate the intersection of two sets, and follows from a property called minwise independence:
for any x /∈ S, Prh[x < minh(S)] = 1|S|+1 .
As defined by Wegman and Carter [WC81] in 1977, a family H = {h : [u] → [m]} of hash
functions is k-independent if for any distinct x1, . . . , xk ∈ [u], the hash codes h(x1), . . . , h(xk) are
independent random variables, and the hash code of any fixed x is uniformly distributed in [m].
Chernoff bounds continue to work with high enough independence [SSS95]; for instance, in-
dependence Θ( lgnlg lgn) suffices for the bound on the maximum bin load. For linear probing, 5-
independence is sufficient [PPR09] and necessary [PT10]. For cuckoo hashing, O(lg n)-independence
suffices and at least 6-independence is needed [CK09]. While minwise independence cannot
be achieved, one can achieve ε-minwise independence with the guarantee (∀)x /∈ S,Prh[x <
minh(S)] = 1±ε|S|+1 . For this, Θ(lg
1
ε ) independence is sufficient [Ind01] and necessary [PT10]. (Note
that the ε is a bias so it is a lower bound on how well set intersection can be approximated, with
any number of independent experiments.)
The canonical construction of k-independent hash functions is a random degree k−1 polynomial
in a prime field, which has small representation but Θ(k) evaluation time. Competitive implemen-
tations of polynomial hashing simulate arithmetic modulo Mersenne primes via bitwise operations.
Even so, tabulation-based hashing with O(u1/c) space and O(ck) evaluation time is significantly
faster [TZ04]. The linear dependence on k is problematic, e.g., when k ≈ lg n.
Siegel [Sie04] shows that a family with superconstant independence but O(1) evaluation time re-
quires Ω(uε) space, i.e. it requires tabulation. He also gives a solution that uses O(u1/c) space, cO(c)
evaluation time, and achieves uΩ(1/c
2) independence (which is superlogarithmic, at least asymptot-
ically). The construction is non-uniform, assuming a certain small expander which gets used in
a graph product. Dietzfelbinger and Rink [DR09] use universe splitting to obtain similar high
independence with some quite different costs. Instead of being highly independent on the whole
universe, their goal is to be highly independent on an unknown but fixed set S of size n. For some
constant parameter γ, they tolerate an error probability of n−γ . Assuming no error, their hash
function is highly independent on S. The evaluation time is constant and the space is sublinear.
For error probability n−γ , each hash computation calls O(γ) subroutines, each of which evaluates
its own degree O(γ) polynomial. The price for a lower error tolerance is therefore a slower hash
function (even if we only count it as constant time in theory).
While polynomial hashing may perform better than its independence suggests, we have no
positive example yet. On the tabulation front, we have one example of a good hash function that
is not formally k-independent: cuckoo hashing works with an ad hoc hash function that combines
space O(n1/c) and polynomials of degree O(c) [DW03].
1.1 Our results
Here we provide an analysis of simple tabulation showing that it has many of the desirable properties
above. For most of our applications, we want to rule out certain obstructions with high probability.
This follows immediately if certain events are independent, and the algorithms design approach is
to pick a hash function guaranteeing this independence, usually in terms of a highly independent
hash function.
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Instead we here stick with simple tabulation with all its dependencies. This means that we have
to struggle in each individual application to show that the dependencies are not fatal. However,
from an implementation perspective, this is very attractive, leaving us with one simple and fast
scheme for (almost) all our needs.
In all our results, we assume the number of characters is c = O(1). The constants in our
bounds will depend on c. Our results use a rather diverse set of techniques analyzing the table
dependencies in different types of problems. For chaining and linear probing, we rely on some
concentration results, which will also be used as a starting point for the analysis of min-wise
hashing. Theoretically, the most interesting part is the analysis for cuckoo hashing, with a very
intricate study of the random graph constructed by the two hash functions.
Chernoff bounds. We first show that simple tabulation preserves Chernoff-type concentration:
Theorem 1. Consider hashing n balls into m ≥ n1−1/(2c) bins by simple tabulation. Let q be an
additional query ball, and define Xq as the number of regular balls that hash into a bin chosen as
a function of h(q). Let µ = E[Xq] =
n
m . The following probability bounds hold for any constant γ:
(∀)δ ≤ 1 : Pr[|Xq − µ| > δµ] < 2e−Ω(δ2µ) +m−γ (1)
(∀)δ = Ω(1) : Pr[Xq > (1 + δ)µ] < (1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)µ) +m−γ (2)
With m ≤ n bins, every bin gets
n/m±O
(√
n/m logc n
)
. (3)
keys with probability 1− n−γ.
Contrasting standard Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., [MR95]), Theorem 1 can only provide polyno-
mially small probability, i.e. at least n−γ for any desired constant γ. In addition, the exponential
dependence on µ in (1) and (2) is reduced by a constant which depends (exponentially) on the con-
stants γ and c. It is possible to get some super polynomially small bounds with super constant γ but
they are not as clean. An alternative way to understand the bound is that our tail bound depends
exponentially on εµ, where ε decays to subconstant as we move more than inversely polynomial
out in the tail. Thus, our bounds are sufficient for any polynomially high probability guarantee.
However, compared to the standard Chernoff bound, we would have to tolerate a constant factor
more balls in a bin to get the same failure probability.
By the union bound (1) implies that with m = Θ(n) bins, no bin receives more than
O(lg n/ lg lg n) balls w.h.p. This is the first realistic hash function to achieve this fundamental
property. Similarly, for linear probing with fill bounded below 1, (2) shows that the longest filled
interval is of length O(log n) w.h.p.
Linear probing. Building on the above concentration bounds, we show that if the table size is
m = (1 + ε)n, then the expected time per operation is O(1/ε2), which asymptotically matches the
bound of Knuth [Knu63] for a truly random function. In particular, this compares positively with
the O(1/ε13/6) bound of [PPR09] for 5-independent hashing.
Our proof is a combinatorial reduction that relates the performance of linear probing to concen-
tration bounds. The results hold for any hash function with concentration similar to Theorem 1.
To illustrate the generality of the approach, we also improve the O(1/ε13/6) bound from [PPR09]
for 5-independent hashing to the optimal O(1/ε2). This was raised as an open problem in [PPR09].
4
For simple tabulation, we get quite strong concentration results for the time per operation, e.g,,
constant variance for constant ε. For contrast, with 5-independent hashing, the variance is only
known to be O(log n) [PPR09,TZ09].
Cuckoo hashing. In general, the cuckoo hashing algorithm fails iff the random bipartite graph
induced by two hash functions contains a component with more vertices than edges. With truly
random hashing, this happens with probability Θ( 1n). Here we study the random graphs induced by
simple tabulation, and obtain a rather unintuitive result: the optimal failure probability is inversely
proportional to the cube root of the set size.
Theorem 2. Any set of n keys can be placed in two table of size m = (1+ε) by cuckoo hashing and
simple tabulation with probability 1−O(n−1/3). There exist sets on which the failure probability is
Ω(n−1/3).
Thus, cuckoo hashing and simple tabulation are an excellent construction for a static dictionary.
The dictionary can be built (in linear time) after trying O(1) independent hash functions w.h.p.,
and later every query runs in constant worst-case time with two probes. We note that even though
cuckoo hashing requires two independent hash functions, these essentially come for the cost of one
in simple tabulation: the pair of hash codes can be stored consecutively, in the same cache line,
making the running time comparable with evaluating just one hash function.
In the dynamic case, Theorem 2 implies that we expect Ω(n4/3) updates between failures re-
quiring a complete rehash with new hash functions.
Our proof involves a complex understanding of the intricate, yet not fatal dependencies in simple
tabulation. The proof is a (complicated) algorithm that assumes that cuckoo hashing has failed,
and uses this knowledge to compress the random tables T1, . . . , Tc below the entropy lower bound.
Using our techniques, it is also possible to show that if n balls are placed in O(n) bins in
an online fashion, choosing the least loaded bin at each time, the maximum load is O(lg lg n) in
expectation.
Minwise independence. In the full version, we show that simple tabulation is ε-minwise in-
dependent, for a vanishingly small ε (inversely polynomial in the set size). This would require
Θ(log n) independence by standard techniques.
Theorem 3. Consider a set S of n = |S| keys and q /∈ S. Then with h implemented by simple
tabulation:
Pr[h(q) < minh(S)] =
1± ε
n
, where ε = O
(
lg2 n
n1/c
)
.
This can be used to estimate the size of set intersection by estimating:
Pr[minh(A) = minh(B)]
=
∑
x∈A∩B
Pr[x < minh(A ∪B \ {x})]
=
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| ·
(
1± O˜
(
1
|A ∪B|1/c
))
.
For good bounds on the probabilities, we would make multiple experiments with independent hash
functions. An alternative based on a single hash function is that we for each set consider the
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k elements with the smallest hash values. We will also present concentration bounds for this
alternative.
Fourth moment bounds. An alternative to Chernoff bounds in proving good concentration is
to use bounded moments. In the full version of the paper, we analyze the 4th moment of a bin’s
size when balls are placed into bins by simple tabulation. For a fixed bin, we show that the 4th
moment comes extremely close to that achieved by truly random hashing: it deviates by a factor
of 1 + O(4c/m), which is tiny except for a very large number of characters c. This would require
4-independence by standard arguments. This limited 4th moment for a given bin was discovered
independently by [BCL+10].
If we have a designated query ball q, and we are interested in the size of a bin chosen as a
function of h(q), the 4th moment of simple tabulation is within a constant factor of that achieved
by truly random hashing (on close inspection of the proof, that constant is at most 2). This would
require 5-independence by standard techniques. (See [PT10] for a proof that 4-independence can
fail quite badly when we want to bound the size of the bin in which q lands.) Our proof exploits
an intriguing phenomenon that we identify in simple tabulation: in any fixed set of 5 keys, one of
them has a hash code that is independent of the other four’s hash codes.
Unlike our Chernoff-type bounds, the constants in the 4th moment bounds can be analyzed quite
easily, and are rather tame. Compelling applications of 4th moment bounds were given by [KR93]
and [Tho09]. In [KR93], it was shown that any hash function with a good 4th moment bound
suffices for a nonrecursive version of quicksort, routing on the hypercube, etc. In [Tho09], linear
probing is shown to have constant expected performance if the hash function is a composition of
universal hashing down to a domain of size O(n), with a strong enough hash function on this small
domain (i.e. any hash function with a good 4th moment bound).
We will also use 4th moment bounds to attain certain bounds of linear probing not covered by
our Chernoff-type bounds. In the case of small fill α = nm = o(1), we use the 4
th moment bounds
to show that the probability of a full hash location is O(α).
Pseudorandom numbers. The tables used in simple tabulation should be small to fit in the
first level of cache. Thus, filling them with truly random numbers would not be difficult (e.g. in
our experiments we use atmospheric noise from random.org). If the amount of randomness needs
to be reduced further, we remark that all proofs continue to hold if the tables are filled by a
Θ(lg n)-independent hash function (e.g. a polynomial with random coefficients).
With this modification, simple tabulation naturally lends itself to an implementation of a very
efficient pseudorandom number generator. We can think of a pseudorandom generator as a hash
function on range [n], with the promise that each h(i) is evaluated once, in the order of increasing i.
To use simple tabulation, we break the universe into two, very lopsided characters: [ nR ]× [R], for R
chosen to be Θ(lg n). Here the second coordinate is least significant, that is, (x, y) represents xR+y.
During initialization, we fill T2[1 . . R] with R truly random numbers. The values of T1[1 . . n/R] are
generated on the fly, by a polynomial of degree Θ(lg n), whose coefficients were chosen randomly
during initialization. Whenever we start a new row of the matrix, we can spend a relatively large
amount of time to evaluate a polynomial to generate the next value r1 which we store in a register.
For the next R calls, we run sequentially through T2, xoring each value with r1 to provide a new
pseudorandom number. With T2 fitting in fast memory and scanned sequentially, this will be
much faster than a single multiplication, and with R large, the amortized cost of generating r1
is insignificant. The pseudorandom generator has all the interesting properties discussed above,
including Chernoff-type concentration, minwise independence, and random graph properties.
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Experimental evaluation. We performed an experimental evaluation of simple tabulation. Our
implementation uses tables of 256 entries (i.e. using c = 4 characters for 32-bit data and c = 8
characters with 64-bit data). The time to evaluate the hash function turns out to be competitive
with multiplication-based 2-independent functions, and significantly better than for hash functions
with higher independence. We also evaluated simple tabulation in applications, in an effort to
verify that the constants hidden in our analysis are not too large. Simple tabulation proved very
robust and fast, both for linear probing and for cuckoo hashing.
Notation. We now introduce some notation that will be used throughout the proofs. We want
to construct hash functions h : [u] → [m]. We use simple tabulation with an alphabet of Σ and
c = O(1) characters. Thus, u = Σc and h(x1, . . . , xc) =
⊕c
i=1 Ti[xi]. It is convenient to think of
each hash code Ti[xi] as a fraction in [0, 1) with large enough precision. We always assume m is a
power of two, so an m-bit hash code is obtained by keeping only the most significant log2m bits
in such a fraction. We always assume the table stores long enough hash codes, i.e. at least log2m
bits.
Let S ⊂ Σc be a set of |S| = n keys, and let q be a query. We typically assume q /∈ S, since
the case q ∈ S only involves trivial adjustments (for instance, when looking at the load of the bin
h(q), we have to add one when q ∈ S). Let pi(S, i) be the projection of S on the i-th coordinate,
pi(S, i) = {xi | (∀)x ∈ S}.
We define a position-character to be an element of [c] × Σ. Then, the alphabets on each
coordinate can be assumed to be disjoint: the first coordinate has alphabet {1}×Σ, the second has
alphabet {2} × Σ, etc. Under this view, we can treat a key x as a set of q position-characters (on
distinct positions). Furthermore, we can assume h is defined on position characters: h((i, α)) =
Ti[α]. This definition is extended to keys (sets of position-characters) in the natural way h(x) =⊕
α∈x h(α).
When we say with high probability in r, we mean 1 − ra for any desired constant a. Since
c = O(1), high probability in |Σ| is also high probability in u. If we just say high probability, it is
understood to be in n.
2 Concentration Bounds
This section proves Theorem 1, except branch (3) which is shown in the full version of the paper.
If n elements are hashed into n1+ε bins by a truly random hash function, the maximum load of
any bin is O(1) with high probability. First we show that simple tabulation preserves this guarantee.
Building on this, we shows that the load of any fixed bin obeys Chernoff bounds. Finally we show
that the Chernoff bound holds even for a bin chosen as a function of the query hash code, h(q).
As stated in the introduction, the number of bins is always understood to be a power of two.
This is because our hash values are xor’ed bit strings. If we want different numbers of bins we could
view the hash values as fractions in the unit interval and divide the unit interval into subintervals.
Translating our results to this setting is standard.
2.1 Hashing into Many Bins
The notion of peeling lies at the heart of most work in tabulation hashing. If a key from a set of
keys contains one position-character that doesn’t appear in the rest of the set, its hash code will be
independent of the rest. Then, it can be “peeled” from the set, as its behavior matches that with
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truly random hashing. More formally, we say a set T of keys is peelable if we can arrange the keys
of T in some order, such that each key contains a position-character that doesn’t appear among
the previous keys in the order.
Lemma 4. Suppose we hash n ≤ m1−ε keys into m bins, for some constant ε > 0. For any
constant γ, all bins get less than d = min
{
((1 + γ)/ε)c , 2(1+γ)/ε
}
keys with probability ≥ 1−m−γ.
Proof. We will show that among any d elements, one can find a peelable subset of size t ≥
max{d1/c, lg d}. Then, a necessary condition for the maximum load of a bin to be at least d is
that some bin contain t peelable elements. There are at most
(
n
t
)
< nt such sets. Since the hash
codes of a peelable set are independent, the probability that a fixed set lands into a common bin
is 1
/
mt−1. Thus, an upper bound on the probability that the maximum load is d can be obtained:
nt/mt−1 = m(1−ε)t/mt−1 = m1−εt. To obtain failure probability m−γ , set t = (1 + γ)/ε.
It remains to show that any set T of |T | = d keys contains a large peelable subset. Since
T ⊂ pi(T, 1) × · · · × pi(T, c), it follows that there exists i ∈ [c] with |pi(T, i)| ≥ d1/c. Pick some
element from T for every character value in pi(S, i); this is a peelable set of t = d1/c elements.
To prove t ≥ log2 d, we proceed iteratively. Consider the coordinate giving the largest projection,
j = arg maxi |pi(T, i)|. As long as |T | ≥ 2, |pi(T, j)| ≥ 2. Let α be the most popular value in T
for the j-th character, and let T ? contain only elements with α on the j-th coordinate. We have
|T ?| ≥ |T |/|pi(T, j)|. In the peelable subset, we keep one element for every value in pi(T, j) \ {α},
and then recurse in T ? to obtain more elements. In each recursion step, we obtain k ≥ 1 elements,
at the cost of decreasing log2 |T | by log2(k+1). Thus, we obtain at least log2 d elements overall.
We note that, when the subset of keys of interest forms a combinatorial cube, the probabilistic
analysis in the proof is sharp up to constant factors. In other words, the exponential dependence
on c and γ is inherent.
2.2 Chernoff Bounds for a Fixed Bin
We study the number of keys ending up in a prespecified bin B. The analysis will define a total
ordering ≺ on the space of position-characters, [c] × Σ. Then we will analyze the random process
by fixing hash values of position-characters h(α) in the order ≺. The hash value of a key x ∈ S
becomes known when the position-character max≺ x is fixed. For α ∈ [c]× Σ, we define the group
Gα = {x ∈ S | α = max≺ x}, the set of keys for whom α is the last position-character to be fixed.
The intuition is that the contribution of each group Gα to the bin B is a random variable
independent of the previous Gβ’s, since the elements Gα are shifted by a new hash code h(α).
Thus, if we can bound the contribution of Gα by a constant, we can apply Chernoff bounds.
Lemma 5. There is an ordering ≺ such that the maximal group size is maxα |Gα| ≤ n1−1/c.
Proof. We start with S being the set of all keys, and reduce S iteratively, by picking a position-
character α as next in the order, and removing keys Gα from S. At each point in time, we pick the
position-character α that would minimize |Gα|. Note that, if we pick some α as next in the order,
Gα will be the set of keys x ∈ S which contain α and contain no other character that hasn’t been
fixed: (∀)β ∈ x \ {α}, β ≺ α.
We have to prove is that, as long as S 6= ∅, there exists α with |Gα| ≤ |S|1−1/c. If some position
i has |pi(S, i)| > |S|1/c, there must be some character α on position i which appears in less than
|S|1−1/c keys; thus |Gα| ≤ S1−1/c. Otherwise, pi(S, i) ≤ |S|1/c for all i. Then if we pick an arbitrary
character α on some position i, have |Gα| ≤
∏
j 6=i |pi(S, j)| ≤ (|S|1/c)c−1 = |S|1−1/c.
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From now on assume the ordering ≺ has been fixed as in the lemma. This ordering partitions
S into at most n non-empty groups, each containing at most n1−1/c keys. We say a group Gα is
d-bounded if no bin contains more than d keys from Gα.
Lemma 6. Assume the number of bins is m ≥ n1−1/(2c). For any constant γ, with probability
≥ 1−m−γ, all groups are d-bounded where
d = min
{
(2c(3 + γ)c, 22c(3+γ)
}
Proof. Since |Gα| ≤ n1−1/c ≤ m1−1/(2c), by Lemma 4, we get that there are at most d keys from
Gα in any bin with probability 1−m−(2+γ) ≥ 1−m−γ/n. The conclusion follows by union bound
over the ≤ n groups.
Henceforth, we assume that γ and d are fixed as in Lemma 6. Chernoff bounds (see [MR95,
Theorem 4.1]) consider independent random variables X1, X2, · · · ∈ [0, d]. Let X =
∑
iXi, µ =
E[X], and δ > 0, the bounds are:
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
)µ/d
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤
(
e−δ
(1− δ)(1−δ)
)µ/d (4)
Let Xα be the number of elements from Gα landing in the bin B. We are quite close to applying
Chernoff bounds to the sequence Xα, which would imply the desired concentration around µ =
n
m .
Two technical problems remain: Xα’s are not d-bounded in the worst case, and they are not
independent.
To address the first problem, we define the sequence of random variables Xˆα as follows: if
Gα is d-bounded, let Xˆα = Xα; otherwise Xˆα = |Gα|/m is a constant. Observe that
∑
α Xˆα
coincides with
∑
αXα if all groups are d-bounded, which happens with probability 1−m−γ . Thus
a probabilistic bound on
∑
α Xˆα is a bound on
∑
αXα up to an additive m
−γ in the probability.
Finally, the Xˆα variables are not independent: earlier position-character dictate how keys clus-
ter in a later group. Fortunately (4) holds even if the distribution of each Xi is a function of
X1, . . . , Xi−1, as long as the mean E[Xi | X1, . . . , Xi−1] is a fixed constant µi independent of
X1, ..., Xi−1. A formal proof will be given in Appendix B. We claim that our means are fixed this
way: regardless of the hash codes for β < α, we will argue that E[Xˆα] = µα = |Gα|/m.
Observe that whether or not Gα is d-bounded is determined before h(α) is fixed in the order ≺.
Indeed, α is the last position-character to be fixed for any key in Gα, so the hash codes of all keys
in Gα have been fixed up to an xor with h(α). This final shift by h(α) is common to all the keys,
so it cannot change whether or not two elements land together in a bin. Therefore, the choice of
h(α) does not change if Gα is d-bounded.
After fixing all hash codes β ≺ α, we decide if Gα is d-bounded. If not, we set Xˆα = |Gα|/m.
Otherwise Xˆα = Xα is the number of elements we get in B when fixing h(α), and h(α) is a uniform
random variable sending each element to B with probability 1/m. Therefore E[Xˆα] = |Gα|/m.
This completes the proof that the number of keys in bin B obeys Chernoff bounds from (4), which
immediately imply (1) and (2) in Theorem 1.
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2.3 The Load of a Query-Dependent Bin
When we are dealing with a special key q (a query), we may be interested in the load of a bin
Bq, chosen as a function of the query’s hash code, h(q). We show that the above analysis also
works for the size of Bq, up to small constants. The critical change is to insist that the query
position-characters come first in our ordering ≺:
Lemma 7. There is an ordering ≺ placing the characters of q first, in which the maximal group
size is 2 · n1−1/c.
Proof. After placing the characters of q at the beginning of the order, we use the same iterative
construction as in Lemma 5. Each time we select the position-character α minimizing |Gα|, place α
next in the order ≺, and remove Gα from S. It suffices to prove that, as long as S 6= ∅, there exists
a position-character α /∈ q with |Gα| ≤ 2 · |S|1−1/c. Suppose in some position i, |pi(S, i)| > |S|1/c.
Even if we exclude the query character qi, there must be some character α on position i that
appears in at most |S|/(|pi(S, i)| − 1) keys. Since S 6= ∅, |S|1/c > 1, so |pi(S, i)| ≥ 2. This means
|pi(S, i)| − 1 ≥ |S|1/c/2, so α appears in at most 2|S|1−1/c keys. Otherwise, we have pi(S, i) ≤ |S|1/c
for all i. Then, for any character α on position i, we have |Gα| ≤
∏
j 6=i |pi(S, j)| ≤ |S|1−1/c.
The lemma guarantees that the first nonempty group contains the query alone, and all later
groups have random shifts that are independent of the query hash code. We lost a factor two
on the group size, which has no effect on our asymptotic analysis. In particular, all groups are
d-bounded w.h.p. Letting Xα be the contribution of Gα to bin Bq, we see that the distribution of
Xα is determined by the hash codes fixed previously (including the hash code of q, fixing the choice
of the bin Bq). But E[Xα] = |Gα|/m holds irrespective of the previous choices. Thus, Chernoff
bounds continue to apply to the size of Bq. This completes the proof of (1) and (2) in Theorem 1.
In Theorem 1 we limited ourselves to polynomially small error bounds m−γ for constant γ.
However, we could also consider a super constant γ = ω(1) using the formula for d in Lemma 6.
For the strongest error bounds, we would balance m−γ with the Chernoff bounds from (4). Such
balanced error bounds would be messy, and we found it more appealing to elucidate the standard
Chernoff-style behavior when dealing with polynomially small errors.
2.4 Few bins
We will now settle Theorem 1 (3), proving some high probability bounds for the concentration with
m ≤ n bins. As stated in (3), we will show, w.h.p., that the number of keys in each bin is
n/m±O(
√
n/m logc n).
Consider any subset S of s ≤ n keys that only vary in b characters. Generalizing (3), we will show
for any L ≥ 32 log n, that with probability 1− exp(−Ω(L)), the keys in S get distributed with{
s/m±√s/mLb if s ≥ mLb/2
≤ Lb if s ≤ mLb/2 (5)
keys in each of the m bins. This is trivial for m = 1, so we can assume m ≥ 2. The proof is by
induction on (b, s). First we will prove that each inductive step fails with small probability. Later
we will conclude that the combined failure probability for the whole induction is small.
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For the base case of the induction, if s ≤ Lb, the result is trivial since it holds even if some bin
gets all the keys from S. This case includes if we have no characters to vary, that is, when s = 1
and b = 0. We may therefore assume that s > Lb, and b > 0. The characters positions where S do
not vary will only shuffle the bins, but not affect which keys from S go together, so we can ignore
them when giving bounds for the sizes of all bins.
Considering the varying characters in S, we apply the ordering from Section 2.2 leading to a
grouping of S. By Lemma 5, there is an ordering ≺ such that the maximal group size is maxα |Gα| ≤
s1−1/b. In particular, maxα |Gα| < s/L.
First, assume that s ≤ mLb/2. Each group has one less free character, so by induction, each
group has at most Lb−1 keys in each bin, that is, each group is Lb−1-bounded. Now as in Section 2.2,
for any fixed bin, we can apply the Chernoff upper-bound from (4) with d = Lb−1. We have
µ = s/m ≤ Lb/2, and we want to bound the probability of getting a bin of size at least x = Lb ≥ 2µ.
For an upper bound, we use µ′ = x/2 ≥ µ and δ′ = 1, and get a probability bound of(
eδ
′
(1 + δ′)(1+δ′)
)µ′/d
= (e/4)µ
′/d ≤ (e/4)L/2.
With the union bound, the probability that any bin has more than Lb keys is bounded by m(e/4)L/2.
Partitioning many keys. Next, we consider the more interesting case where s ≥ mLb/2. As
stated in (5), we want to limit the probability that the contribution S to any bin deviates by more
than
√
s/mLb from the mean s/m. We partition the groups into levels i based on their sizes. On
level 0 we have the groups of size up to mLb−1/2. On level i > 0, we have the groups of size
between ti = mL
b−12i−2 and 2ti. For each i, we let Si denote the union of the level i groups. We
are going to handle each level i separately, providing a high probability bound on how much the
contribution of Si to a given bin can deviate from the mean. Adding the deviations from all levels,
we bound the total deviation in the contribution from S to this bin. Let si be the number of keys
in Si and define
∆i =
√
si/mL
b−1/2. (6)
For level i > 0, we will use ∆i as our deviation bound, while we for i = 0, will use ∆¯0 = max{∆0, Lb}.
The total deviation. We will now show that the above level deviation bounds provide the
desired total deviation bound of
√
s/mLb from (5). Summing over the levels, the total deviation is
bounded by Lb +
∑
i
√
si/mL
b−1/2. To bound the sum, we first consider the smaller terms where
si < s/ log n. Then
√
si/mL
b−1/2 ≤√s/mLb/√L log n. We have at most logn values of i, so these
smaller terms sum to at most
√
s/mLb
√
(log n)/L.
Next we consider the larger terms where si ≥ s/ log n. Each such term can be bounded as√
si/mL
b−1/2 =
(
(si/m)/
√
si/m
)
Lb−1/2
≤
(
(si/m)/
√
s/m
)
Lb
√
log n/L.
The sum of the larger terms is therefore also bounded by
√
s/mLb
√
(log n)/L. Thus the
total deviation is bounded by Lb +
√
s/mLb2
√
(log n)/L. Assuming L ≥ 9 log n, we have
2
√
(log n)/L ≤ 2/3. Moreover, with n ≥ 4 and b ≥ 1, we have s/m > Lb/2 ≥ 9. It follows
that Lb + 2
√
(log n)/L
√
s/mLb ≤√s/mLb, as desired.
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Deviation from small groups. We now consider the contribution to our bin from the small
groups in S0. These groups have size most (mL
b/2)1−1/b ≤ mLb−1/2, and b − 1 free character
positions, so inductively from (5), each group contributes at most d0 ≤ Lb−1 to each bin. We want
to bound the probability that the deviation from the mean µ0 = s0/m exceeds ∆¯0 = max{∆0, Lb}.
Suppose µ0 ≤ ∆¯0. For a Chernoff upper bound, we use µ′ = ∆¯0 ≥ µ0 and δ′ = 1, and get a
probability bound of (
eδ
′
/(1 + δ′)(1+δ
′)
)µ′/d0
= (e/4)µ
′/d0 ≤ (e/4)L.
On the other hand, if µ0 ≥ ∆0, we have a relative deviation of δ0 = ∆0/µ0 =
√
m/s0L
b−1/2 ≤ 1.
The probability of this deviation for any fixed bin is bounded by(
eδ0/(1 + δ0)
(1+δ0)
)µ0/d0 ≤ exp(−(µ0/d0)δ20/3) = exp(−Lb/3) ≤ exp(−L/3).
Larger groups. To deal with a larger group level i > 1, we will use a standard symmetric Chernoff
bound, which is easily derived from the negative version of (4). We consider independent n random
variables X1, ...., Xn ∈ [−d, d], each with mean zero. Let X =
∑
iXi. For any δ > 0,
Pr[|X| ≥ δdn] ≤ 2 exp(−nδ2/4) (7)
As we did for (4) in Section 2.2, we note that (7) also holds when Xi depends on the previous Xj ,
j < i, as long as |Xi| ≤ d and E[Xi] = 0. Back to our problem, let si be the total size. Each group
G has size at least ti = mL
b−12i−2, so we have at most ni = si/ti groups. The group G has only
b− 1 varying characters and ti ≥ t1 = mLb−1/2, so inductively from (5), the contribution of G to
any bin deviates by at most di =
√|G|/mLb−1 < √2ti/mLb−1 from the mean |G|/m. We let XG
denote the contribution of G to our bin minus the mean |G|/m. Thus, regardless of the distribution
of previous groups, we have E[XG] = 0 and |XG| ≤ di. We want to bound the probability that
|∑GX| ≥ ∆i. We therefore apply (7) with
δi = ∆i/(dini) =
√
si/mL
b−1/2/
(√
2ti/mL
b−1si/ti
)
=
√
tiL/(2si).
The probability that the contribution to our bin deviates by more than ∆i is therefore bounded by
2 exp(−niδ2i /4) = 2 exp(−si/ti ·
√
tiL/(2si)
2
/4) = 2 exp(−L/8).
Conveniently, this dominates the error probabilities of (e/4)L and exp(−L/3) from level 0. There
are less log n levels, so by the union bound, the probability of a too large deviation from any level
to any bin is bounded by m(log n)2 exp(−L/8).
Error probability for the whole induction. Above we proved that any particular inductive
step fails with probability at most m(log n)2 exp(−L/8). We want to conclude that the probability
of any failure in the whole induction is bounded by nm exp(−L/8).
First we note that the all the parameters of the inductive steps are determined deterministically.
More precisely, the inductive step is defined via the deterministic grouping from Lemma 5. This
grouping corresponds to a certain deterministic ordering of the position characters, and we use
this ordering to analyze the failure probability of the inductive step. However, there is no relation
between the ordering used to analyze different inductive steps. Thus, we are dealing with a recursive
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deterministic partitioning. Each partitioning results in groups that are at least L times smaller,
so the recursion corresponds to a tree with degrees at least L. At the bottom we have base cases,
each containing at least one key. The internal nodes correspond to inductive steps, so we have less
than 2n/L of these. If L ≥ 4 log n, we conclude that the combined failure probability is at most
2n/Lm(log n)2 exp(−L/8) ≤ nm exp(−L/8). With L ≥ 32 log n, we get that the overall failure
probability is bounded by exp(−L/64). This completes our proof that (5) is satisfied with high
probability, hence the proof of Theorem 1 (3).
3 Linear Probing and the Concentration in Arbitrary Intervals
We consider linear probing using simple tabulation hashing to store a set S of n keys in an array of
size m (as in the rest of our analyses, m is a power of two). Let α = 1− ε = nm be the fill. We will
argue that the performance with simple tabulation is within constant factors of the performance
with a truly random function, both in the regime ε ≥ 1/2 (high fill) and α ≤ 1/2 (low fill). With
high fill, the expected number of probes when we insert a new key is O(1/ε2) and with low fill, it
is 1 +O(α).
Pagh et al. [PPR09] presented an analysis of linear probing with 5-independent hashing using
4th moment bounds. They got a bound of O(1/ε13/6) on the expected number of probes. We feel
that our analysis, which is centered around dyadic intervals, is simpler, tighter, and more generic.
Recall that a dyadic interval, is an interval of the form [j2i, (j + 1)2i) for integers i and j. In fact,
as we shall see later in Section 6.4, our analysis also leads to an optimal O(1/ε2) for 5-independent
hashing, settling an open problem from [PPR09]. However, with simple tabulation, we get much
stronger concentration than with 5-independent hashing, e.g., constant variance with constant ε
whereas the variance is only known to be O(log n) with 5-independent hashing.
When studying the complexity of linear probing, the basic measure is the length R = R(q, S)
of the longest run of filled positions starting from h(q), that is, positions h(q), ..., h(q) + ` − 1 are
filled with keys from S while h(q) + R is empty. This is the case if and only if R is the largest
number such there is an interval I which contains h(q) and h(q) + R − 1 and such that I is full
in the sense that at least |I| keys from S hash to I. In our analysis, we assume that q is not in
the set. An insert or unsuccessful search with q will consider exactly R+ 1 positions. A successful
search for q will consider at most R(q, S \ {q}) + 1 positions. For deletions, the cost is R(q, S) + 1
but where q ∈ S. For now we assume q 6∈ S, but we shall return to the case q ∈ S in Section 3.1.
Aiming for upper bounds on R(q, S), it is simpler to study the symmetric length L(q, S) of the
longest filled interval containing h(q). Trivially R(q, S) ≤ L(q, S). We have n = |S| keys hashed
into m positions. We defined the fill α = n/m and ε = (1 − α). The following theorem considers
the case of general relative deviations δ. To bound Pr[L(q, S) ≥ `], we can apply it with p = h(q)
and δ = ε or (1 + δ) = 1/α.
Theorem 8. Consider hashing a set of n keys into {0, ...,m− 1} using simple tabulation (so m is
a power of two). Define the fill α = n/m. Let p be any point which may or may not be a function of
the hash value of specific query key not in the set. Let D`,δ,p be the event that there exists an interval
I containing p and of length at least ` such that the number of keys XI in I deviates at least δ
from the mean, that is, |XI −α|I|| ≥ δα|I|. Suppose α` ≤ n1/(3c), or equivalently, m/` ≥ n1−1/(3c).
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Then for any constant γ,
Pr[D`,δ,p] ≤
{
2e−Ω(α`δ2) + (`/m)γ if δ ≤ 1
(1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α`) + (`/m)γ if δ = Ω(1)
(8)
Moreover, with probability 1− n−γ, for every interval I, if α|I| ≥ 1, the number of keys in I is
α|I| ±O
(√
α|I| logc n
)
. (9)
Theorem 8 is a very strong generalization of Theorem 1. A bin from Theorem 8 corresponds
to a specific dyadic interval of length ` = 2i (using m′ = m/2i in Theorem 8). In Theorem 8 we
consider every interval of length at least ` which contains a specific point, yet we get the same
deviation bound modulo a change in the constants hidden in the Ω-notation.
To prove the bound on D`,δ,p, we first consider the weaker event Ci,δ,p for integer i that there
exists an interval I 3 p, 2i ≤ |I| < 2i+1, such that the relative deviation δ in the number of keys
XI is at least δ. As a start we will prove that the bound from (8) holds for Ci,δ,p. Essentially
Theorem 8 will follow because the probability bounds decrease exponentially in i.
When bounding the probability of Ci,δ,p, we will consider any i such that α2i ≤ n1/(2c) whereas
we in Theorem 8 only considered α` ≤ n1/(3c). The constraint α2i ≤ n1/(2c) matches that in
Theorem 1 with m′ = m/2i. In Theorem 1 we required m′ ≥ n1−1/(2c) ⇐⇒ n/m′ = α2i ≤ n1/(2c).
Our proof is based on decompositions of intervals into dyadic intervals. To simplify the ter-
minology and avoid confusion between intervals and dyadic intervals, we let a bin on level j, or
for short, a j-bin, denote a dyadic interval of length 2j . The expected number of keys in a j-bin
is µj = α2
j . The j-bins correspond to the bins in Theorem 1 with m′ = m/2j . For any j ≤ i,
consider the j-bin containing p, and the 2i+1−j j-bins on either side. We say that these 2i+2−j + 1
consecutive j-bins are relevant to Ci,δ,p noting that they cover any I 3 p, |I| ≤ 2i+1.
δ = Ω(1). To handle δ = Ω(1), we will use the following combinatorial claim that holds for any δ.
Claim 9. Let j be maximal such that 2j < δ1+δ/22
i−2. If Ci,δ,p happens, then one of the relevant
j-bins contains more than (1 + δ2)α2
j keys.
Proof. Assume that all the relevant j-bins have relative deviation at most δ2 . Let I be an interval
witnessing Ci,δ,p, that is, p ∈ I, 2i ≤ |I| < 2i+1, and the number of keys in I deviates by δα|I| from
the mean α|I|. The interval I contains some number of the j-bins, and properly intersects at most
two in the ends. The relative deviation within I is δ, but the j-bins have only half this relative
deviation. This means that the j-bins contained in I can contribute at most half the deviation. The
remaining δ2α|I| has to come from the two j-bins intersected in the ends. Those could contribute
all or none of their keys to the deviation (e.g. all keys are on the last/first position of the interval).
However, together they have at most 2(1 + δ2)α2
j < δα2i−1 ≤ δ2α|I| keys.
Let δ = Ω(1) and define j as in Claim 9. Then j = i− Ω(1). To bound the probability of Ci,δ,p
it suffices to bound the probability that none of the 2i+2−j + 1 = O(1) relevant j-bins has relative
deviation beyond δ′ = δ/2. We will apply Theorem 1 (2) with m′ = m/2j and µ′ = α2j to each
of these j-bins. Checking the conditions of Theorem 1, we note that the k’th relevant j-bin can
specified as a function of p which again may be a function of the hash of the query. Also, as noted
above, m′ > m/2i ≥ n/(α2i) ≥ n1−1/(2c). From (2) we get that
Pr[Ci,δ,p] = O(1)
(
(1 + δ/2)−Ω((1+δ/2)α2
j) + (2j/m)γ
)
= (1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α2
i) +O
(
(2i/m)γ
)
.
14
δ ≤ 1. We now consider the case δ ≤ 1. In particular, this covers the case δ = o(1) which was not
covered above. The issue is that if we apply Claim 9, we could get j = i−ω(1), hence ω(1) relevant
j-bins, and then the applying the union bound would lead to a loss. To circumvent the problem we
will consider a tight decomposition involving bins on many levels below i but with bigger deviations
on lower levels. For any level j ≤ i, we say that a j-bin is “dangerous” for level i if it has deviation
at least:
∆j,i =
δα2i
24 /2
(i−j)/5 = δα24 · 2
4
5
i+ 1
5
j .
Claim 10. Let j0 be the smallest non-negative integer satisfying ∆j0,i ≤ α2j0. If Ci,δ,p happens,
then for some j ∈ {j0, ..., i}, there is a relevant j-bin which is dangerous for level i.
Proof. Witnessing Ci,δ,p, let I 3 p, 2i ≤ |I| < 2i+1, have at least (1 + δ)α|I| keys. First we make
the standard dyadic decomposition of I into maximal level bins: at most two j-bins on each level
j = 0 . . i. For technical reasons, if j0 > 0, the decomposition is “rounded to level j0”. Formally,
the decomposition rounded to level j0 is obtained by discarding all the bins on levels below j0, and
including one j0-bin on both sides (each covering the discarded bins on lower levels). Note that all
the level bins in the decomposition of I are relevant to Ci,δ,p.
Assume for a contradiction that no relevant bin on levels j0, ..., i is dangerous for level i. In
particular, this includes all the level bins from our decomposition. We will sum their deviations,
and show that I cannot have the required deviations. In case of rounding, all keys in the two
rounding j0-bins can potentially be in or out of I (all keys in such intervals can hash to the
beginning/end), contributing at most ∆j0,i + α2
j0 keys to the deviation in I. By choice of j0, we
have α2j0−1 < ∆j0−1,i. It follows that the total contribution from the rounding bins is at most
2(∆j0,i + α2
j0) ≤ 2(∆j0,i + 2∆j0−1,i) < 6∆i,i = δα2
i
4 .
The other bins from the decomposition are internal to I. This includes discarded ones in case of
rounding. A j-bin contributes at most ∆j,i to the deviation in I, and there are at most 2 such
j-bins for each j. The combined internal contribution is therefore bounded by
2
i∑
j=0
∆j,i = 2
i∑
j=0
(
δα2i
24
/2(i−j)/5
)
=
δα2i
12
i∑
h=0
1/2h/5 <
δα2i
12
/(1− 2−1/5) < 7.73δα2
i
12
(10)
The total deviation is thus at (14 +
7.73
12 )δα2
i, contradicting that I had deviation δα2i.
For each j = j0, ..., i, we bound the probability that there exists a relevant j-bin which is
dangerous for level i. There are 22+i−j + 1 such intervals. We have mean µj = α2j and deviation
δi,jµj = ∆i,j = Θ(δ2
4
5
i+ 1
5
j). Therefore δi,j = ∆i,j/µj = Θ(δ2
4
5
(i−j)). Note that δi,j < 1 by choice of
j0. We can therefore apply (1) from Theorem 1. Hence, for any constant γ, the probability that
there exists a relevant j-bin which is dangerous for i is bounded by
(22+i−j + 1)
(
2e−Ω(µjδ
2
i,j) + (2j/m)γ
)
≤ O(2i−j)
(
e−Ω(α2
jδ24(i−j)/5)2) + (2j/m)γ
)
= O
(
2i−je−Ω
(
α2iδ22
3
5 (i−j)
)
+ (2i/m)γ/2(i−j)(γ−1)
)
.
To bound the probability of Ci,δ,p, we sum the above bound for j = j0, ..., i. We will argue that
the j = i dominates. If γ > 2, then clearly this is the case for the term O
(
(2i/m)γ/2(i−j)(γ−1)
)
. It
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remains to argue that
i−j0∑
h=0
O
(
2he−Ω(α2
iδ22
3
5h)
)
= O(e−Ω(α2
iδ2)). (11)
At first this may seem obvious since the increase with h is exponential while the decrease is doubly
exponential. The statement is, however, not true if α2iδ2 = o(1), for e
−Ω
(
α2iδ22
3
5h
)
≈ 1 as long
as α2iδ22
3
5
h = o(1). We need to argue that α2iδ2 = Ω(1). Then for h = ω(1), the bound will
decrease super-exponentially in h. Recall that our final goal for δ ≤ 1 is to prove that Pr[Ci,δ,p] ≤
2 exp(−Ω(α2iδ2)) + O ((2i/m)γ). This statement is trivially true if exp(−Ω(α2iδ2)) ≥ 1/2. Thus
we may assume exp(−Ω(α2iδ2)) < 1/2 and this implies α2iδ2 = Ω(1), as desired. Therefore the
sum in (11) is dominated in by the case h = (i− j) = 0. Summing up, for any constant γ > 2 and
δ ≤ 1, we have proved that
Pr[Ci,δ,p] =
i−j0∑
h=0
O
(
2he
−Ω
(
α2iδ22
3
5h
)
+ (2i/m)γ/2h(γ−1)
)
= O
(
e−Ω(α2
iδ2) + (2i/m)γ
)
= 2e−Ω(α2
iδ2) +O((2i/m)γ).
The constraint γ > 2 has no effect, since we get better bounds with larger γ as long as γ remains
constant. All together, for α2i ≤ n1/(2c) or equivalently, m/2i ≥ n1−1/(2c), we have proved
Pr[Ci,δ,p] ≤
{
2e−Ω(α2iδ2) + (2i/m)γ if δ ≤ 1
(1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α2i) + (2i/m)γ if δ = Ω(1)
(12)
We now want to bound Pr[D`,δ,p] as in (8). For our asymptotic bound, it suffices to consider
cases where ` = 2k is a power of two. Essentially we will use the trivial bound Pr[D2k,δ,p] ≤∑
h≥0 Pr[Ck+h,δ,p]. First we want to argue that the terms e−Ω(α2
k+hδ2) = e−Ω(α2kδ2)2h , δ ≤ 1, and
(1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α2k+h) = (1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α2k)2h , δ = Ω(1), are dominated by the case h = 0. Both
terms are of the form 1/a2
h
and we want to show that a = 1 + Ω(1). For the case δ ≤ 1, we can
use the same trick before: to prove (8) it suffices to consider exp(−Ω(α2kδ2)) < 1/2 which implies
α2kδ2 = Ω(1) and eΩ(α2
kδ2) = 1 + Ω(1). When it comes to (1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α2k+h), we have δ = Ω(1).
Moreover, to get the strongest probability bound on Pr[D2k,δ,p], we can assume (1 + δ)α2k ≥ 1.
More precisely, suppose (1 + δ)α2k < 1 and define δ′ > δ such that (1 + δ′)α2k = 1. If an interval
is non-empty, it has at least 1 key, so D2k,δ,p ⇐⇒ D2k,δ′,p, and the probability bound from (8)
is better with the larger δ′. Thus we can assume (1 + δ)Ω((1+δ)α2k) = 1 + Ω(1). We have now
established that for any relevant δ, the bound from (12) is of the form
1/a2
h
+ (2k+h/m)γ where a = 1 + Ω(1).
As desired the first term is dominated by the smallest h = 0. Two issues remain: the second term
is dominated by larger h and (12) only applies when m/2k+h ≥ n1−1/(2c). Define h¯ as the smallest
value such that a2
h¯ ≥ m/2k. We have 2h¯ = dloga(m/2k)e = O(log(m/2k)) and the condition for
(8) is that n1−1/(3c) ≤ m/2k, so m/2k+h¯ = (m/2k)/O(log(m/2k)) = Ω˜(n1−1/(3c)) > n1−1/(2c). We
conclude that (12) applies for any h ≤ h¯.
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To handle h ≥ h¯ we consider the more general event Ai,δ that the contribution to any interval
of length at least 2i has relative deviation at least δ. It is easy to see that
Pr[Ai,δ] ≤ m/2i · Pr[Ci,δ,p]. (13)
More precisely, consider the m/2i points p that are multiples of 2i. Any interval I of length ≥ 2i
can be partitioned into intervals Ij such that 2
i ≤ |Ij | < 2i+1 and pj = jm/2i ∈ Ij . If I has
relative deviation δ, then so does some Ij , and then Ci,δ,pj is satisfied. Thus (13) follows. With our
particular value of i = k + h¯, for any γ > 1, we get
Pr[Ak+h¯,δ] ≤ m/2k+h¯ Pr[Ck+h¯,δ,p] = m/2k+h¯
(
1/a2
h¯
+ (2k+h¯/m)γ
)
≤ m/2k+h¯
(
2k/m+ (2k+h¯/m)γ
)
= (2k+h¯+1/m)γ−1 = Ω˜(2k/m)γ−1
Finally we are ready to compute Pr[D2k,δ,p] ≤
∑h¯−1
h=0 Pr[Ck+h,δ,p] + Pr[Ak+h¯,δ]. In Pr[Ck+h,δ,p] =
1/a2
h
+ (2k+h/m)γ the terms 1/a2
h
were dominated by h = 0, and the terms (2k+h/m)γ are
dominated by h = h¯ which is covered by Pr[Ak+h¯,δ]. We conclude that
Pr[D2k,δ,p] ≤
{
2e−Ω(α2kδ2) + Ω˜(2k/m)γ−1 if δ ≤ 1
(1 + δ)−Ω((1+δ)α2k) + Ω˜(2k/m)γ−1 if δ = Ω(1)
Since γ can always be picked larger, this completes the proof of (8) in Theorem 8.
3.1 The cost of linear probing
We now return to the costs of the different operations with linear probing and simple tabulation
hashing. We have stored a set S of n keys in a table of size m. Define the fill α = n/m and
ε = 1 − α. For any key q we let R = R(q, S) be the number of filled positions from the hash
location of q to the nearest empty slot. For insertions and unsuccessful searches, we have q 6∈ S,
and then the number of cells probed is exactly R(q, S) + 1. This also expresses the number of
probes when we delete, but in deletions, we have q ∈ S. Finally, in a successful search, the number
of probes is bounded by R(q, S \{q}) + 1. From Theorem 8 we get tail bounds on R(q, S) including
the case where q ∈ S:
Corollary 11. For any γ = O(1) and ` ≤ n1/(3c)/α,
Pr[R(q, S) ≥ `] ≤
{
2e−Ω(`ε2) + (`/m)γ if α ≥ 1/2
α−Ω(`) + (`/m)γ if α ≤ 1/2 (14)
Proof. When q 6∈ S, we simply apply (8) from Theorem 8 with p = h(q). If ε ≤ 1/2, we use δ = ε,
and if α ≤ 1/2, we use (1 + δ) = 1/α implying δ ≥ 1/2. In fact, we can do almost the same if
q ∈ S. We will only apply Theorem 8 to S′ = S \ {q} which has fill α′ < α. If α ≥ 1/2 we note
that (14) does not provide a non-trivial bounds if ` = O(1/ε2), so we can easily assume ` ≥ 2/ε.
For any interval of this length to be filled by S, the contribution from S′ has to have a relative
deviation of at least ε/2. For α ≤ 1/2, we note that we can assume ` ≥ 4, and we choose δ such
that (1 + 2δ) = 1/α. Since 1/α ≥ 2, we have (1 + δ) ≤ (3/4)/α. For an interval of length ` to be
full, it needs (1 + 2δ)α` ≥ 1 + (1 + δ)α` keys from S, so it needs at least (1 + δ)α` keys from S′.
Now (14) follows from (8) since (1 + δ) >
√
1 + 2δ =
√
1/α.
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From Corollary 11 it follows that we for α ≥ 1/2 get a tight concentration of R(q, S) around
Θ(1/ε2), e.g., for any moment p = O(1), E[R(q, S)p] = O(1/ε2p).
Now consider smaller fills α ≤ 1/2. Corollary 11 does not offer strong bound on Pr[R(q, S) > 0].
It works better when R(q, S) exceeds some large enough constant. However, in Section 6, we show
that simple tabulation satisfies a certain 4th moment bounds, and in Section 6.4 (26), we show that
when q 6∈ S, this implies that linear probing fills a location depending on h(q) with probability
O(α). Thus we add to Corollary 11 that for q 6∈ S,
Pr[R(q, S) > 0] = O(α). (15)
Combining this with the exponential drop for larger R(q, S) in Corollary 11, it follows for any
constant moment p that E[R(q, S)p] = O(α) when q 6∈ S.
Now consider q ∈ S as in deletions. The probability that S′ = S \{q} fills either h(q) or h(q)+1
is O(α). Otherwise S fills h(q) leaving h(q) + 1 empty, and then R(q, S) = 1. Therefore, for q ∈ S,
Pr[R(q, S) > 1] = O(α). (16)
Combining this with the exponential drop for larger R(q, S) in Corollary 11, it follows for any
constant moment p that E[R(q, S)p] = 1 +O(α) when q ∈ S.
3.2 Larger intervals
To finish the proof of Theorem 8, we need to consider the case of larger intervals. We want to show
that, with probability 1 − n−γ for any γ = O(1), for every interval I where the mean number of
keys is α|I| ≥ 1, the deviation is at most
O
(√
α|I| logc n
)
.
Consider an interval I with α|I| ≥ 1. As in the proof of Claim 10, we consider a maximal dyadic
decomposition into level bins with up to two j-bins for each j ≤ i = blog2 |I|c. Let j0 = dlog2(1/α)e.
Again we round to level j0, discarding the lower level bins, but adding a j0-bin on either side. The
deviation in I is bounded by total deviation of the internal bins plus the total contents of the side
bins. The expected number of keys in each side bins is α2j0 ≤ 2.
For each j ∈ {j0, ..., i}, we apply Theorem 1 with m′ = m/2j ≤ αm = n bins. W.h.p., the
maximal deviation for any j-bins is O
(√
n/m′ logc n
)
= O
(√
α2j logc n
)
. This gives a total
deviation of at most
2
2 +O (√α2j0 logc n)+ i∑
j=j0
O
(
(
√
α2j logc n
) = O ((√α|I| logc n) ,
as desired. For each j there is an error probability of n−γ′ for any γ′ = O(1). The error probability
over all j ∈ {j0, ..., i} is (i−j0 +1)n−γ′ . Here i−j0 ≤ log2m− log2(1/α) = log2m− log2 mn = log2 n,
so (i− j0 + 1)n−γ ≤ n−γ′(1 + log n). This completes the proof Theorem 8.
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3.3 Set estimation
We can easily apply our results for set estimation where one saves a bottom-k sketch. More precisely,
suppose we for a set A store a sample S consisting of the k keys with the smallest hash values.
Consider now some subset B ⊆ A. We then use |B ∩ S|/k as an estimator for |B|/|A|. We can
use the above bounds to bound the probability that this estimator is wrong by more than a factor
1+δ
1−δ . Let τ be the kth hash value of A. First we use the bounds to argue that τ = (1 ± δ)k/|A|.
Next we use them to argue that the number of elements from B below any given τ ′ is (1± δ)τ ′|B|.
Applying this with τ ′ = (1− δ)k/|A|, (1 + δ)k/|A|, we get the desired bound.
4 Cuckoo Hashing
We are now going to analyze cuckoo hashing. In our analysis of chaining and linear probing, we
did not worry so much about constants, but with Cuckoo hashing, we do have to worry about
obstructions that could be stem from the hashing of just a constant number of keys, e.g., as an
extreme case we could have three keys sharing the same two hash locations. It is, in fact, a constant
sized obstruction that provides the negative side of our result:
Observation 12. There exists a set S of n keys such that cuckoo hashing with simple tabulation
hashing cannot place S into two tables of size 2n with probability Ω(n−1/3).
Proof. The hard instance is the 3-dimensional cube [n1/3]3. Here is a sufficient condition for cuckoo
hashing to fail:
• there exist a, b, c ∈ [n1/3]2 with h0(a) = h0(b) = h0(c);
• there exist x, y ∈ [n1/3] with h1(x) = h1(y).
If both happen, then the elements ax, ay, bx, by, cx, cy cannot be hashed. Indeed, on the left
side h0(a) = h0(b) = h0(c) so they only occupy 2 positions. On the right side, h1(x) = h1(y) so
they only occupy 3 positions. In total they occupy 5 < 6 positions.
The probability of 1. is asymptotically (n2/3)3/n2 = Ω(1). This is because tabulation (on two
characters) is 3-independent. The probability of 2. is asymptotically (n1/3)2/n = Ω(1/n1/3). So
overall cuckoo hashing fails with probability Ω(n−1/3).
Our positive result will effectively show that this is the worst possible instance: for any set S,
the failure probability is O(n−1/3).
The proof is an encoding argument. A tabulation hash function from Σc 7→ [m] has entropy
|Σ|c lgm bits; we have two random functions h0 and h1. If, under some event E , one can encode
the two hash functions h0, h1 using
(
2|Σ|c lgm) − γ bits, it follows that Pr[E ] = O(2−γ). Letting
ES denote the event that cuckoo hashing fails on the set of keys S, we will demonstrate a saving
of γ = 13 lg n − f(c, ε) = 13 lg n − O(1) bits in the encoding. Note that we are analyzing simple
tabulation on a fixed set of n keys, so both the encoder and the decoder know S.
We will consider various cases, and give algorithms for encoding some subset of the hash codes
(we can afford O(1) bits in the beginning of the encoding to say which case we are in). At the
end, the encoder will always list all the remaining hash codes in order. If the algorithm chooses
to encode k hash codes, it will use space at most k lgm − 13 lg n + O(1) bits. That is, it will save
1
3 lg n−O(1) bits in the complete encoding of h0 and h1.
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Figure 1: Minimal obstructions to cuckoo hashing.
4.1 An easy way out
A subkey is a set of position-characters on distinct positions. If a is a subkey, we let C(a) = {x ∈
S | a ⊆ x} be the set of “completions” of a to a valid key.
We first consider an easy way out: there subkeys a and b on the positions such that |C(a)| ≥
n2/3, |C(b)| ≥ n2/3, and hi(a) = hi(b) for some i ∈ {0, 1}. Then we can easily save 13 lg n − O(1)
bits. First we write the set of positions of a and b, and the side of the collision (c+ 1 bits). There
are at most n1/3 subkeys on those positions that have ≥ n2/3 completions each, so we can write
the identities of a and b using 13 lg n bits each. We write the hash codes hi for all characters in
a∆b (the symmetric difference of a and b), skipping the last one, since it can be deduced from the
collision. This uses c+ 1 + 2 · 13 lg n+ (|a∆b| − 1) lgm bits to encode |a∆b| hash codes, so it saves
1
3 lg n−O(1) bits.
The rest of the proof assumes that there is no easy way out.
4.2 Walking Along an Obstruction
Consider the bipartite graph with m nodes on each side and n edges going from h0(x) to h1(x)
for all x ∈ S. Remember that cuckoo hashing succeeds if and only if no component in this graph
has more edges than nodes. Assuming cuckoo hashing failed, the encoder can find a subgraph with
one of two possible obstructions: (1) a cycle with a chord; or (2) two cycles connected by a path
(possibly a trivial path, i.e. the cycles simply share a vertex).
Let v0 be a node of degree 3 in such an obstruction, and let its incident edges be a0, a1, a2. The
obstruction can be traversed by a walk that leaves v0 on edge a0, returns to v0 on edge a1, leaves
again on a2, and eventually meets itself. Other than visiting v0 and the last node twice, no node
or edge is repeated. See Figure 1.
Let x1, x2, . . . be the sequence of keys in the walk. The first key is x1 = a0. Technically, when
the walk meets itself at the end, it is convenient to expand it with an extra key, namely the one it
first used to get to the meeting point. This repeated key marks the end of the original walk, and
we chose it so that it is not identical to the last original key. Let x≤i =
⋃
j≤i xj be the position-
characters seen in keys up to xi. Define xˆi = xi \ x<i to be the position-characters of xi not seen
previously in the sequence. Let k be the first position such that xˆk+1 = ∅. Such a k certainly exists,
since the last key in our walk is a repeated key.
At a high level, the encoding algorithm will encode the hash codes of xˆ1, . . . , xˆk in this order.
Note that the obstruction, hence the sequence (xi), depends on the hash functions h0 and h1. Thus,
the decoder does not know the sequence, and it must also be written in the encoding.
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For notational convenience, let hi = hi mod 2. This means that in our sequence xi and xi+1
collide in their hi hash code, that is hi(xi) = hi(xi+1). Formally, we define 3 subroutines:
Id(x): Write the identity of x ∈ S in the encoding, which takes lg n bits.
Hashes(hi, xk): Write the hash codes hi of the characters xˆk. This takes |xˆk| lgm bits.
Coll(xi, xi+1): Document the collision hi(xi) = hi(xi+1). We write all hi hash codes of characters
xˆi ∪ xˆi+1 in some fixed order. The last hash code of xˆi∆xˆi+1 is redundant and will be
omitted. Indeed, the decoder can compute this last hash code from the equality hi(xi) =
hi(xi+1). Since xˆi+1 = xi+1 \ x≤i, xˆi+1 \ xˆi 6= ∅, so there exists a hash code in xˆi∆xˆi+1. This
subroutine uses
(|xˆi∪ xˆi+1|−1) lgm bits, saving lgm bits compared to the trivial alternative:
Hashes(hi, xi);Hashes(hi, xi+1).
To decode the above information, the decoder will need enough context to synchronize with the
coding stream. For instance, to decode Coll(xi, xi+1), one typically needs to know i, and the
identities of xi and xi+1.
Our encoding begins with the value k, encoded with O(lg k) bits, which allows the decoder to
know when to stop. The encoding proceeds with the output of the stream of operations:
Id(x1);Hashes(h0, x1); Id(x2);Coll(x1, x2);
. . . Id(xk);Coll(xk, xk−1);Hashes(hk, xk)
We observe that for each i > 1, we save ε bits of entropy. Indeed, Id(xi) uses lg n bits, but
Coll(xi−1, xi) then saves lgm = lg((1 + ε)n) ≥ ε+ lg n bits.
The trouble is Id(x1), which has an upfront cost of lg n bits. We must devise algorithms that
modify this stream of operations and save 43 lg n−O(1) bits, giving an overall saving of 13 lg n−O(1).
(For intuition, observe that a saving that ignores the cost of Id(x1) bounds the probability of an
obstruction at some fixed vertex in the graph. This probability must be much smaller than 1/n,
so we can union bound over all vertices. In encoding terminology, this saving must be much more
than lg n bits.)
We will use modifications to all types of operations. For instance, we will sometimes encode
Id(x) with much less than lg n bits. At other times, we will be able to encode Coll(xi, xi+1) with
the cost of |xˆi ∪ xˆi+1| − 2 characters, saving lg n bits over the standard encoding.
Since we will make several such modifications, it is crucial to verify that they only touch distinct
operations in the stream. Each modification to the stream will be announced at the beginning of
the stream with a pointer taking O(lg k) bits. This way, the decoder knows when to apply the
special algorithms. We note that terms of O(lg k) are negligible, since we are already saving εk bits
by the basic encoding (ε bits per edge). For any k, O(lg k) ≤ εk + f(c, ε) = k +O(1). Thus, if our
overall saving is 13 lg n−O(lg k) + εk, it achieves the stated bound of lg n−O(1).
4.3 Safe Savings
Remember that xˆk+1 = ∅, which suggests that we can save a lot by local changes towards the end
of the encoding. We have xk+1 ⊂ x≤k, so xk+1 \ x<k ⊆ xˆk. We will first treat the case when
xk+1 \ x<k is a proper subset of xˆk (including the empty subset). This is equivalent to xˆk 6⊂ xk+1.
Lemma 13 (safe-strong). If xˆk 6⊂ xk+1, we can save lg n−O(c lg k) bits by changing Hashes(xk).
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Proof. We can encode Id(xk+1) using c lg k extra bits, since it consists only of known characters
from x≤k. For each position 1 . . c, it suffices to give the index of a previous xi that contained the
same position-character. Then, we will write all hash codes hk for the characters in xˆk, except
for some α ∈ xˆk \ xk+1. From hk(xk) = hk(xk+1), we have hk(α) = hk(xk \ {α}) ⊕ hk(xk+1). All
quantities on the right hand side are known (in particular α /∈ xk+1), so the decoder can compute
hk(α).
It remains to treat the case when the last revealed characters of xk+1 are precisely xˆk: xˆk ⊂ xk+1.
That is, both xk and xk+1 consist of xˆk and some previously known characters. In this case, the
collision hk(xk) = hk(xk+1) does not provide us any information, since it reduces to the trivial
hk(xˆk) = hk(xˆk). Assuming that we didn’t take the “easy way out”, we can still guarantee a more
modest saving of 13 lg n bits:
Lemma 14 (safe-weak). Let K be the set of position-characters known before encoding Id(xi), and
assume there is no easy way out. If xi∆xi+1 ⊆ x<i, then we can encode both Id(xi) and Id(xi+1)
using a total of 23 lg n+O(c lg |K|) bits.
A typical case where we apply the lemma is i = k and K = x<k. If xˆk ⊂ xk+1, we have
xk∆xk+1 ⊂ K. Thus, we can obtain Id(xk) for roughly 23 lg n bits, which saves 13 lg n bits.
Proof of Lemma 14. With O(c lg k) bits, we can code the subkeys xi∩x<i and xi+1∩x<i. It remains
to code z = xi \ x<i = xi+1 \ x<i. Since z is common to both keys xi and xi+1, we have that xi \ z
and xi+1 \ z are subkeys on the same positions. With no easy way out and hi(xi \ z) = hi(xi+1 \ z),
we must have |C(xi \ z)| ≤ n2/3 or |C(xi+1 \ z)| ≤ n2/3. In the former case, we code z as a member
of C(xi \ z) with d23 lg ne bits; otherwise we code z as member of C(xi+1 \ z).
4.4 Piggybacking
Before moving forward, we present a general situation when we can save lg n bits by modifying a
Coll(xi, xi+1) operation:
Lemma 15. We can save lg n−O(lg k) bits by modifying Coll(xi, xi+1) if we have identified two
(sub)keys e and f satisfying:
hi(e) = hi(f); e∆f ⊂ x≤i+1; ∅ 6= (e∆f) \ x<i 6= (xi∆xi+1) \ x<i.
Proof. In the typical encoding of Coll(xi, xi+1), we saved one redundant character from hi(xi) =
hi(xi+1), which is an equation involving (xi∆xi+1)\x<i and some known characters from x<i. The
lemma guarantees a second linearly independent equation over the characters xˆi ∪ xˆi+1, so we can
save a second redundant character.
Formally, let α be a position-character of (e∆f)\x<i, and β a position-character in (xi∆xi+1)\
x<i but outside (e∆f) \ x<i. Note β 6= α and such a β exists by assumption. We write the hi hash
codes of position characters (xˆi ∪ xˆi+1) \ {α, β}. The hash hi(α) can be deduced since α is the last
unknown in the equality hi(e \ f) = hi(f \ e). The hash hi(β) can be deduced since it is the last
unknown in the equality hi(x) = hi(xi+1).
While the safe saving ideas only require simple local modifications to the encoding, they achieve
a weak saving of 13 lg n bits for the case xˆk ⊂ xk+1. A crucial step in our proof is to obtain a saving
of lg n bits for this case. We do this by one of the following two lemmas:
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Lemma 16 (odd-size saving). Consider two edges e, f and an i ≤ k − 2 satisfying:
hi+1(e) = hi+1(f); e \ x≤i 6= f \ x≤i; e \ x≤i+1 = f \ x≤i+1.
We can save lg n−O(c lg k) bits by changing Coll(xi+1, xi+2).
Proof. We apply Lemma 15 with the subkeys e˜ = e \ f and f˜ = f \ e. We can identify these
in O(c lg k) bits, since they only contain characters of x≤i+1. Since e and f have different free
characters before xˆi+1, but identical free characters afterward, it must be that e˜ ∪ f˜ ⊂ xi+1 by
e˜∪ f˜ 6⊆ x≤i. To show (e∆f) \x<i 6= (xi+1∆xi+2) \x≤i, remark that xˆi+2 6= ∅ and xˆi+2 cannot have
characters of e˜ ∪ f˜ . Thus, Lemma 15 applies.
Lemma 17 (piggybacking). Consider two edges e, f and an i ≤ k − 1 satisfying:
hi(e) = hi(f); e \ x≤i 6= f \ x≤i; e \ x≤i+1 = f \ x≤i+1.
We can encode Id(e) and Id(f) using only O(c lg k) bits, after modifications to Id(xi), Id(xi+1),
and Coll(xi, xi+1).
The proof of this lemma is more delicate, and is given below. The difference between the two
lemmas is the parity (side in the bipartite graph) of the collision of xi and xi+1 versus the collision
of e and f . In the second result, we cannot actually save lg n bits, but we can encode Id(e) and
Id(f) almost for free: we say e and f piggyback on the encodings of xi and xi+1.
Through a combination of the two lemmas, we can always achieve a saving lg n bits in the case
xˆk ⊂ xk+1, improving on the safe-weak bound:
Lemma 18. Assume k is minimal such that xˆk ⊂ xk+1. We can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits if we
may modify any operations in the stream, up to those involving xk+1.
Proof. We will choose e = xk and f = xk+1. We have e \ x<k = f \ x<k = xˆk. On the other
hand, e \ x1 6= f \ x1 since x1 only reveals one character per position. Thus there must be some
1 ≤ i < k − 1 where the transition happens: e \ x≤i 6= f \ x≤i but e \ x≤i+1 = f \ x≤i+1. If i has
the opposite parity compared to k, Lemma 16 saves a lg n term. (Note that i ≤ k − 2 as required
by the lemma.)
If i has the same parity as k, Lemma 17 gives us Id(xk) at negligible cost. Then, we can
remove the operation Id(xk) from the stream, and save lg n bits. (Again, note that i ≤ k − 2 as
required.)
Proof of Lemma 17. The lemma assumed e \ x≤i 6= f \ x≤i but e \ x≤i+1 = f \ x≤i+1. Therefore,
e∆f ⊂ x≤i+1 and (e∆f) ∩ xˆi+1 6= ∅. Lemma 15 applies if we furthermore have (e∆f) \ x<i 6=
(xi∆xi+1) \ x<i. If the lemma applies, we have a saving of lg n, so we can afford to encode Id(e).
Then Id(f) can be encoded using O(c lg k) bits, since f differs from e only in position-characters
from x≤i+1.
If the lemma does not apply, we have a lot of structure on the keys. Let y = xˆi \ (e ∪ f) and
g = e \ x≤i+1 = f \ x≤i+1. We must have y ⊂ xi+1, for otherwise xˆi \ xi+1 contains an elements
outside e∆f and the lemma applies. We must also have xˆi+1 ⊂ e ∪ f .
We can write Id(xi), Id(xi+1), Id(e), and Id(f) using 2 lg n+O(c lg k) bits in total, as follows:
• the coordinates on which y and g appear, taking 2c bits.
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• the value of y using Huffman coding. Specifically, we consider the projection of all n keys on
the coordinates of y. In this distribution, y has frequency C(y)n , so its Huffman code will use
lg nC(y) +O(1) bits.
• the value of g using Huffman coding. This uses lg nC(g) +O(1) bits.
• if C(y) ≤ C(g), we write xi and xi+1. Each of these requires dlog2C(y)e bits, since y ⊂ xi, xi+1
and there are C(y) completions of y to a full key. Using an additional O(c lg k) bits, we can
write e∩x≤i+1 and f ∩x≤i+1. Remember that we already encoded g = e \x≤i+1 = f \x≤i+1,
so the decoder can recover e and f .
• if C(g) < C(y), we write e and f , each requiring dlog2C(g)e bits. Since we know y = xˆi\(e∪f),
we can write xi using O(c lg k) bits: write the old characters outside xˆi, and which positions
of e ∪ f to reuse in xˆi. We showed xˆi+1 ⊂ e ∪ f , so we can also write xi+1 using O(c lg k).
Overall, the encoding uses space: lg nC(ξ) +lg
n
C(eˆi+1)
+2 lg min
{
C(ξ), C(eˆi+1)
}
+O(c lg k) ≤ 2 lg n+
O(c lg k) .
4.5 Putting it Together
We now show how to obtain a saving of at least 43 lg n−O(c lg k) bits by a careful combination of
the above techniques. Recall that our starting point is three edges a0, a1, a2 with h0(a0) = h0(a1) =
h0(a2). The walk x1, ..., xk+1 started with x1 = a0 and finished when xˆk+1 = ∅. We will now involve
the other starting edges a1 and a2. The analysis will split into many cases, each ended by a ’3’.
Case 1: One of a1 and a2 contains a free character. Let j ∈ {1, 2} such that aj 6⊆ x≤k.
Let y1 = aj . We consider a walk y1, y2, . . . along the edges of the obstruction.Let yˆi = yi \x≤k \y≤i
be the free characters of yi (which also takes all xi’s into consideration). We stop the walk the first
time we observe yˆ`+1 = ∅. This must occur, since the graph is finite and there are no leaves (nodes
of degree one) in the obstruction. Thus, at the latest the walk stops when it repeats an edge.
We use the standard encoding for the second walk:
Id(y1);Coll(a0, y1); Id(y2);Coll(y2, y1);
. . . ;Id(y`);Coll(y`−1, y`);Hashes(h`, y`)
Note that every pair Id(yj),Coll(yj−1, yj) saves ε bits, including the initial
Id(y1),Coll(a0, y1). To end the walk, we can use one of the safe savings of Lemmas 13
and 14. These give a saving of 13 lg n − O(c lg(` + k)) bits, by modifying only Hashes(h`, y`) or
Id(y`). These local changes cannot interfere with the first walk, so we can use any technique
(including piggybacking) to save lg n−O(c log k) bits from the first walk. We obtain a total saving
of 43 lg n−O(1), as required. 3
We are left with the situation a1 ∪ a2 ⊆ x≤k. This includes the case when a1 and a2 are actual
edges seen in the walk x1, . . . , xk.
Let tj be the first time aj becomes known in the walk; that is, aj 6⊆ x<tj but aj ⊆ x≤tj . By
symmetry, we can assume t1 ≤ t2. We begin with two simple cases.
Case 2: For some j ∈ {1, 2}, tj is even and tj < k. We will apply Lemma 15 and save
lg n − O(c lg k) bits by modifying Coll(xtj , xtj+1). Since tj < k, this does not interact with safe
savings at the end of the stream, so we get total saving of at least 43 lg n−O(c lg k).
We apply Lemma 15 on the keys e = a0 and f = aj . We must first write Id(aj), which takes
O(c lg k) bits given x≤k. We have a0 ∪ aj ⊆ x≤tj by definition of tj . Since aj ∩ xˆtj 6= ∅ and
xˆtj+1 ∩ (aj ∪ a0) = ∅, the lemma applies. 3
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Case 3: For some j ∈ {1, 2}, tj is odd and aj \ x<tj−1 6= xˆtj−1∆xˆtj . This assumption is
exactly what we need to apply Lemma 15 with e = a0 and f = aj . Note that h0(e) = h0(f) and
tj is odd, so the lemma modifies Coll(xtj−1, xtj ). The lemma can be applied in conjunction with
any safe saving, since the safe savings only require modifications to Id(xk) or Hashes(hk, xk). 3
We now deal with two cases when t1 = t2 (both being odd or even). These require a combination
of piggybacking followed by safe-weak savings. Note that in the odd case, we may assume a1 \
x<t−1 = a2 \ x<t−1 = xˆt−1∆xˆt (due to case 3 above), and in the even case we may assume
t1 = t2 = k (due to case 2 above).
Case 4: t1 = t2 = t is odd and a1 \ x<t−1 = a2 \ x<t−1 = xˆt−1∆xˆt. We first get a1 and a2
by piggybacking or odd-side saving. Let i be the largest value such that a1 \ x≤i 6= a2 \ x≤i. Since
a1 \ x<t−1 = a2 \ x<t−1, we have i ≤ t− 3. The last key that piggybacking or odd-side saving can
interfere with is xt−2.
We will now use the safe-weak saving of Lemma 14 to encode Id(xt−1) and Id(xt). The known
characters are K = x<t−1 ∪ a1 ∪ a2, so xt−1∆xt ⊆ K. Lemma 14 codes both Id(xt−1) and Id(xt)
with 23 lg n + O(c lg k) bits, which represents a saving of roughly
4
3 lg n over the original encoding
of the two identities. We don’t need any more savings from the rest of the walk after xt. 3
Case 5: t1 = t2 = k is even. Thus, k is even and the last characters of a1 and a2 are only
revealed by xˆk.
Lemma 19. We can save 2 lg n − O(c lg k) bits by modifying Hashes(hk, xk), unless both: (1)
a1 ∩ xˆk = a2 ∩ xˆk; and (2)xˆk \ xk+1 is the empty set or equal to a1 ∩ xˆk.
Proof. The h0 hash codes of the following 3 subkeys are known from the hash codes in x<k: a1∩ xˆk,
a2∩ xˆk (both because we know h0(a0) = h0(a1) = h0(a2)), and xˆk \xk+1 (since xk and xk+1 collide).
If two of these subsets are distinct and nonempty, we can choose two characters α and β from their
symmetric difference. We can encode all characters of xˆk except for α and β, whose hash codes can
be deduced for free.
Since aj ∩ xˆk 6= in the current case, the situations when we can find two distinct nonempty sets
are: (1) a1 ∩ xˆk 6= a2 ∩ xˆk; or (2) a1 ∩ xˆk = a2 ∩ xˆk but xˆk \ xk+1 is nonempty and different from
them.
From now on assume the lemma fails. We can still save lgn bits by modifying Hashes(hk, xk).
We reveal all hash codes of xˆk, except for one position-character α ∈ a1 ∩ xˆk. We then specify
Id(a1), which takes O(c lg k) bits. The hash h0(α) can then be deduced from h0(a1) = h0(a0).
We will now apply piggybacking or odd-side saving to a1 and a2. Let i be the largest value with
a1 \ x≤i 6= a2 \ x≤i. Note that a1 \ x<k = a2 \ x<k, so i < k − 1. If i is odd, Lemma 16 (odd-side
saving) can save lg n bits by modifying Coll(xi+1, xi+2); this works since i + 2 ≤ k. If i is even,
Lemma 17 (piggybacking) can give use Id(a) and Id(b) at a negligible cost of O(c lg k) bits. This
doesn’t touch anything later than Id(xi+1), where i+ 1 < k.
When we arrive at Id(xk), we know the position characters K = x<k ∪ a1 ∪ a2. This means
that xk∆xk+1 ⊆ K, because xˆk \ xk+1 is either empty or a subset of a1. Therefore, we can use
weak-safe savings from Lemma 14 to code Id(xk) in just
1
3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits. In total, we have
save at least 43 lg n−O(c lg k) bits. 3
It remains to deal with distinct t1, t2, i.e. t1 < t2 ≤ k. If one of the numbers is even, it must
be t2 = k, and then t1 must be odd (due to case 2). By Case 3, if tj is odd, we also know
aj \ x<tj−1 = xˆtj−1∆xˆtj . Since these cases need to deal with at least one odd tj , the following
lemma will be crucial:
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Lemma 20. If tj ≤ k is odd and aj \ x<tj−1 = xˆtj−1∆xˆtj , we can code Id(xtj−1) and Id(xtj ) with
3
2 lg n+O(c lg k) bits in total.
Proof. Consider the subkey y = xˆtj−1 \ xtj . We first specify the positions of y using c bits. If
C(y) ≥ √n, there are at most √n possible choices of y, so we can specify y with 12 lg n bits. We can
also identify xtj with lg n bits. Then Id(xtj−1) requires O(c lg k) bits, since xtj−1 ⊆ y∪xtj ∪x<tj−1.
If C(y) ≤ √n, we first specify Id(xtj−1) with lg n bits. This gives us the subkey y ⊆ xtj−1. Since
aj \ x<tj−1 = xˆtj−1∆xˆtj , it follows that y ⊂ aj . Thus, we can write Id(aj) using lgC(y) ≤ lg 12 lg n
bits. Since xtj ⊆ x≤tj−1 ∪ aj , we get Id(xtj ) for an additional O(c lg k) bits.
Case 6: Both t1 and t2 are odd, t1 < t2 < k, and for all j ∈ {1, 2}, aj \ x<tj−1 =
xˆtj−1∆xˆtj . We apply Lemma 20 for both j = 1 and j = 2, and save lg n bits in coding Id(xt1−1),
Id(xt1), Id(xt2−1), and Id(xt2). These are all distinct keys, because t1 < t2 and both are odd.
Since t2 < k, we can combine this with any safe saving. 3
Case 7: t2 = k is even and t1 < k is odd with a1 \ x<t1−1 = xˆt1−1∆xˆt1. We apply Lemma
20 for j = 1, and save 12 lg n − O(c lg k) bits in coding Id(xt1−1), Id(xt1). We also save lg n bits
by modifying Hashes(h0, xk). We reveal all hash codes of xˆk, except for one position-character
α ∈ a2 ∩ xˆk (which is a nonempty set since t2 = k). We then specify Id(a2), which takes O(c lg k)
bits. The hash h0(α) can then be deduced from h0(a2) = h0(a0). 3
Case 8: Both t1 and t2 are odd, t1 < t2 = k, and for all j ∈ {1, 2}, aj \ x<tj−1 =
xˆtj−1∆xˆtj . To simplify notation, let t1 = t. This case is the most difficult. If we can apply
strong-safe saving as in Lemma 13, we save lg n by modifying Hashes(hk, xk). We also save lg n by
two applications of Lemma 20, coding Id(xt−1), Id(xt), Id(xk−1), and Id(xk). These don’t interact
since t < k and both are odd.
The strong-safe saving fails if xˆk ⊂ xk+1. We will attempt to piggyback for xk and xk+1. Let i
be the largest value such that xk \ x≤i 6= xk+1 \ x≤i. If i is even, we get an odd-side saving of lg n
(Lemma 16). Since this does not affect any identities, we can still apply Lemma 20 to save 12 lg n
on the identities Id(xt−1) and Id(xt).
Now assume i is odd. We have real piggybacking, which may affect the coding of Id(xi), Id(xi+1)
and Id(xk). Since both i and t are odd, there is at most one common key between {xi, xi+1} and
{xt−1, xt}. We consider two cases:
• Suppose xt−1 /∈ {xi, xi+1}. Let y = xˆt−1 \xt. After piggybacking, which in particular encodes
xt, we can encode Id(xt−1) in lg nC(y) +O(c lg k) bits. Indeed, we can write the positions of y
with c bits and then the identity of y using Huffman coding for all subkeys on those positions.
Finally the identity of xt−1 can be written in O(c lg k) bits, since xt−1 ⊂ x<t−1 ∪ y ∪ xt.
• Suppose xt /∈ {xi, xi+1}. Let y = xˆt \ xt−1. As above, we can write Id(xt) using lg nC(y) +
O(c lg k) bits, after piggybacking.
If C(y) ≥ n1/3, we have obtained a total saving of 43 lg n − O(c lg k): a logarithmic term for
Id(xk) from piggybacking, and
1
3 lg n for Id(xt−1) or Id(xt).
Now assume that C(y) ≤ n1/3. In this case, we do not use piggybacking. Instead, we use a
variation of Lemma 20 to encode Id(xt−1) and Id(xt). First we code the one containing y with
lg n bits. Since a1 \ x<t−1 = xˆt−1∆xˆt, and therefore y ⊂ a1, we have y ⊂ a1. We code Id(a1) with
lgC(y) ≤ 13 lg n bits. We obtain the other key among xt−1 and xt using O(c lg k) bits, since all its
characters are known. Thus we have coded Id(xt−1) and Id(xt) with 43 lg n + O(c lg k) bits, for a
saving of roughly 23 lg n bits.
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Next we consider the coding of Id(xk−1) and Id(xk). We know that a2 \ x<k−1 = xˆk−1∆xˆk
and xˆk ⊂ xk+1. Lemma 20 would guarantee a saving of 12 lg n bits. However, we will perform an
analysis like above, obtaining a saving of 23 lg n bits.
Let y = xˆk−1 \ xk. First assume C(y) ≥ n1/3. We use the safe-weak saving of Lemma 14 to
encode Id(xk) using
2
3 lg n bits. We then encode the subkey y using lg
n
C(y)+O(c) ≤ 23 lg n+O(c) bits,
and finally xk−1 using O(c lg k) bits. This obtains both Id(xk−1) and Id(xk) using 43 lg n+O(c lg k)
bits.
Now assume C(y) ≤ n1/3. We first code Id(xk−1) using lg n bits. This gives us y for the price
of c bits. But a2 \x<k−1 = xˆk−1∆xˆk, so y ⊂ a2, and we can code Id(a2) using lgC(y) ≤ 13 lg n bits.
Then Id(xk) can be coded with O(c lg k) bits. Again, we obtain both Id(xk−1) and Id(xk) for the
price of 43 lg n+O(c lg k) bits. 3
This completes our analysis of cuckoo hashing.
5 Minwise Independence
We will prove that:
1
n
·
(
1− O(lg n)
n1/c
)
≤ Pr[h(q) < minh(X)] ≤ 1
n
·
(
1 +
O(lg2 n)
n1/c
)
(17)
The lower bound is relatively simple, and is shown in §5.1. The upper bound is significantly more
involved and appears in §5.2.
For the sake of the analysis, we divide the output range [0, 1) into n` bins, where ` = γ lg n for a
large enough constant γ. Of particular interest is the minimum bin [0, `n). We choose γ sufficiently
large for the Chernoff bounds of Theorem 1 to guarantee that the minimum bin in non-empty
w.h.p.: Pr[minh(X) < `n ] ≥ 1− 1n2 .
In §5.1 and §5.2, we assume that hash values h(x) are binary fractions of infinite precision
(hence, we can ignore collisions). It is easy to see that (17) continues to hold when the hash codes
have (1 + 1c ) lg n bits, even if ties are resolved adversarially. Let h˜ be a truncation to (1 +
1
c ) lg n
bits of the infinite-precision h. We only have a distinction between the two functions if q is the
minimum and (∃)x ∈ S : h˜(x) = h˜(q). The probability of a distinction is bounded from above by:
Pr
[
h˜(q) ≤ `n ∧ (∃)x ∈ S : h˜(x) = h˜(q)
] ≤ `n · (n · 1n1+1/c ) ≤ O(lgn)n1+1/c
We used 2-independence to conclude that {h(q) < `n} and {h˜(x) = h˜(q)} are independent.
Both the lower and upper bounds start by expressing:
Pr[h(q) < minh(S)] =
∫ 1
0
f(p)dp, where f(p) = Pr[p < minh(S) | h(q) = p].
For truly random hash functions, Pr[p < minh(S) | h(q) = p] = (1 − p)n, since each element has
an independent probability of 1− p of landing about p.
5.1 Lower bound
For a lower bound, it suffices to look at the case when q lands in the minimum bin:
Pr[h(q) < minh(S)] ≥
∫ `/n
0
f(p)dp, where f(p) = Pr[p < minh(S) | h(q) = p]
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We will now aim to understand f(p) for p ∈ [0, `n ]. In the analysis, we will fix the hash codes
of various position-characters in the order ≺ given by Lemma 7. Let h(≺α) done the choice for all
position-characters β ≺ α.
Remember that ≺ starts by fixing the characters of q first, so: q1 ≺ · · · ≺ qc ≺ α0 ≺ α1 ≺ · · ·
Start by fixing h(q1), . . . , h(qc) subject to h(q) = x.
When it is time to fix some position-character α, the hash code of any key x ∈ Gα is a
constant depending on h(≺α) xor the random quantity h(α). This final xor makes h(x) uniform
in [0, 1). Thus, for any choice of h(≺ α), Pr[h(z) < p | h(≺ α)] = p. By the union bound,
Pr[p < minh(Gα) | h(≺α)] ≥ 1− p · |Gα|. This implies that:
f(p) = Pr[p < minh(S) | h(q) = p] ≥
∏
αqc
(1− p · |Gα|). (18)
To bound this product from below, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 21. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and k ≥ 0, where p · k ≤ √2− 1. Then 1− p · k > (1− p)(1+pk)k.
Proof. First we note a simple proof for the weaker statement (1− pk) < (1− p)d(1+pk)ke. However,
it will be crucial for our later application of the lemma that we can avoid the ceiling.
Consider t Bernoulli trials, each with success probability p. The probability of no failures
occurring is (1 − p)t. By the inclusion-exclusion principle, applied to the second level, this is
bounded from above by:
(1− p)t ≤ 1− t · p+
(
t
2
)
p2 < 1− (1− pt2 )t · p
Thus, 1−kp can be bounded from below by the probability that no failure occurs amount t Bernoulli
trials with success probability p, for t satisfying t · (1− pt2 ) ≥ k. This holds for t ≥ (1 + kp)k.
We have just shown 1 − p · k > (1 − p)d(1+pk)ke. Removing the ceiling requires an “inclusion-
exclusion” inequality with a non-integral number of experiments t. Such an inequality was shown
by Gerber [Ger68]: (1 − p)t ≤ 1 − αt + (αt)2/2, even for fractional t. Setting t = (1 + pk)k, our
result is a corollary of Gerber’s inequality:
(1− p)t ≤ 1− pt+ (pt)22 = 1− p(1 + pk)k + 12(p(1 + pk)k)2
= 1− pk − (1− (1+pk)22 )(pk)2 ≤ 1− pk.
The lemma applies in our setting, since p < `n = O(
lgn
n ) and all groups are bounded |Gα| ≤
2 · n1−1/c. Note that p · |Gα| ≤ `n · 2n1−1/c = O(`/n1/c). Plugging into (18):
f(p) ≥
∏
αqc
(1− p · |Gα|) ≥
∏
αqc
(1− p)|Gα|(1+`/n1/c) ≥ (1− p)n·(1+`/n1/c).
Let m = n · (1 + `/n1/c). The final result follows by integration over p:
Pr[h(q) < minh(S)] ≥
∫ `/n
0
f(p)dp ≥
∫ `/n
0
(1− p)mdp
=
−(1− p)m+1
m+ 1
∣∣∣∣`/n
p=0
=
1− (1− `/n)m+1
m+ 1
>
1− e−`
m+ 1
>
1− 1/n
n(1 + `/n1/c)
=
1
n
·
(
1− O(lg n)
n1/c
)
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5.2 Upper bound
As in the lower bound, it will suffice to look at the case when q lands in the minimum bin:
Pr[h(q) < h(S)] ≤ Pr[minh(S) ≥ `n ] + Pr[h(q) < h(S) ∧ h(q) < `n ] ≤ 1n2 +
∫ `/n
0
f(p)dp
To bound f(p), we will fix position-characters in the order ≺ from Lemma 7, subject to h(q) = p.
In the lower bound, we could analyze the choice of h(α) even for the worst-case choice of h(≺α).
Indeed, no matter how the keys in Gα arranged themselves, when shifted randomly by h(α), they
failed to land below p with probability 1− p|Gα| ≥ (1− p)(1+o(1))|Gα|.
For an upper bound, we need to prove that keys from Gα do land below p often enough:
Pr[p < minh(Gα) | h(≺α)] ≤ (1 − p)(1−o(1))|Gα|. However, a worst-case arrangement of Gα could
make all keys equal, which would give the terrible bound of just 1− p.
To refine the analysis, we can use Lemma 4, which says that for d = O(1), all groups Gα are
d-bounded with probability ≥ 1 − 1
n2
. If Gα is d-bounded, its keys cannot cluster in less than
d|Gα|/de different bins.
When a group Gα has more than one key in some bin, we pick one of them as a representative,
by some arbitrary (but fixed) tie-breaking rule. Let Rα be the set of representatives of Gα. Observe
that the set Rα ⊆ Gα is decided once we condition on h(≺α). Indeed, the hash codes for keys in
Gα are decided up to a shift by h(α), and this common shift cannot change how keys cluster into
bins. We obtain:
Pr[p < minh(Gα) | h(≺α)] ≤ Pr[p < minh(Rα) | h(≺α)] = 1− p|Rα| ≤ (1− p)|Rα|
To conclude Pr[p < minh(Rα)] = 1− p|Rα| we used that the representatives are in different bins,
so at most one can land below p. Remember that |Rα| is a function of h(≺α). By d-boundedness,
|Rα| ≥ |Gα|/d, so we get Pr[p < minh(Gα) | h(≺ α)] ≤ (1 − p)|Gα|/d for almost all h(≺ α).
Unfortunately, this is a far cry from the desired exponent, |Gα| ·
(
1− O˜(n−1/c)).
To get a sharper bound, we will need a dynamic view of the representatives. After fixing
h(≺ α), we know whether two keys x and y collide whenever the symmetric difference x∆y =
(x \ y) ∪ (y \ x) consists only of position-characters ≺ α. Define Rβ(α) to be our understanding
of the representatives Rβ just before character α is revealed: from any subset of Gβ that is known
to collide, we select only one key. After the query characters get revealed, we don’t know of any
collisions yet (we know only one character per position), so Rβ(α0) = Gβ. The set of representatives
decreases in time, as we learn about more collisions, and Rβ(β) = Rβ is the final value (revealing
β doesn’t change the clustering of Gβ).
Let C(α) be the number of key pairs (x, y) from the same group Gβ (β  α) such that α =
max≺(x∆y). These are the pairs whose collisions is decided when h(α) is revealed, since h(α) is the
last unknown hash code in the keys, besides the common ones. Let α+ be the successor of α in the
order ≺. Consider the total number of representatives before and after h(α) is revealed: ∑β |Rβ(α)|
versus
∑
β |Rβ(α+)|. The maximum change between these quantities is ≤ C(α), while the expected
change is ≤ C(α) · `n . This is because h(α) makes every pair (x, y) collide with probability `n ,
regardless of the previous hash codes in (x∆y) \ {α}. Note, however, that the number of colliding
pairs may overestimate the decrease in the representatives if the same key is in multiple pairs.
Let n(α) = ∑βα |Gα| and define n(α) simmilarly. Our main inductive claim is:
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Lemma 22. For any setting h(≺α) such that h(q) = p and ∑βα |Rβ(α)| = r, we have:
Pr
[(
p < min
⋃
βα
h(Gβ)
)
∧ (∀α)Gα d-bounded
∣∣ h(≺α)] ≤ P (α, p, r)
where we define P (α, p, r) = (1− p)r + (1− p)n(α)/(2d) ·
∑
βα
4C(β) · (`/n)
n(β)/d .
As the definition P (α, p, r) may look intimidating, we first try to demystify it, while giving a
sketch for the lemma’s proof (the formal proof appears in §5.3.) The lemma looks at the worst-
case probability, over prior choices h(≺ α), that p = h(q) remains the minimum among groups
Gα, Gα+ , . . . . After seeing the prior hash codes, the number of representatives in these groups
is r =
∑
βα |Rβ(α)|. In the ideal case when h(α), h(α+), . . . do not introduce any additional
collisions, we have r representatives that could beat p for the minimum. As argued above, the
probability that p is smaller than all these representatives is ≤ (1 − p)r. Thus, the first term of
P (α, p, r) accounts for the ideal case when no more collisions occur.
On the other hand, the factor (1 − p)n(α)/(2d) accounts for the worst case, with no guarantee
on the representatives except that the groups are d-bounded (the 2 in the exponent is an artifact).
Thus, P (α, p, r) interpolates between the best case and the worst case. This is explained by a
convexity argument: the bound is maximized when h(α) mixes among two extreme strategies — it
creates no more collisions, or creates the maximum it could.
It remains to understand the weight attached to the worst-case probability. After fixing h(α),
the maximum number of remaining representatives is rˆ =
∑
βα |Rβ(α)|. The expected number is
≥ rˆ−C(α) `n , since every collision happens with probability `n . By a Markov bound, the worst case
(killing most representatives) can only happen with probability O
(
`
nC(α)
/
rˆ
)
. The weight of the
worst case follows by rˆ ≥ n(α)/d and letting these terms accrue in the induction for β  α.
Deriving the upper bound.. We now prove the upper bound on Pr[h(q) < h(S)] assuming
Lemma 22. Let α0 be the first position-character fixed after the query. Since fixing the query
cannot eliminate representatives,
Pr[p < minh(S) ∧ (∀α)Gα d-bounded | h(q) = p] ≤ P (α0, p, n)
Lemma 23. P (α0, p, n) ≤ (1− p)n + (1− p)n/(2d) · O(lg
2 n)
n1/c
.
Proof. We will prove that A =
∑
βα0
C(β)
n(β) ≤ n1−1/c ·Hn, where Hn is the Harmonic number.
Consider all pairs (x, y) from the same group Gγ , and order them by β = max≺(x∆y). This is
the time when the pair gets counted in some C(β) as a potential collision. The contribution of the
pair to the sum is 1/n(β), so this contribution is maximized if β immediately precedes γ in the
order ≺. That is, the sum is maximized when C(β) = (|Gβ+ |
2
)
. We obtain A ≤∑β |Gβ |22 /n(β) ≤
n1−1/c ·∑β |Gβ|/n(β). In this sum, each key x ∈ Gβ contributes 1/n(β), which is bounded by
one over the number of keys following x. Thus A ≤ Hn.
To achieve our original goal, bounding Pr[h(q) < h(S)], we proceed as follows:
Pr[h(q) < h(S)] ≤ 1
n2
+
∫ `/n
0
Pr[p < minh(S) | h(q) = p]dp
≤ 1
n2
+ Pr[(∃α)Gα not d-bounded] +
∫ `/n
0
P (α0, p, n)dp
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By Lemma 4, all groups are d-bounded with probability 1− 1
n2
. We also have∫ `/n
0
(1− p)ndp = −(1− p)
n+1
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣`/n
p=0
≤ 1
n+ 1
Thus:
Pr[h(q) < h(S)] ≤ O(1)
n2
+
1
n+ 1
+
1
n/(2d) + 1
· O(lg
2 n)
n1/c
=
1
n
·
(
1 +
O(lg2 n)
n1/c
)
.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 22
Recall that we are fixing some choice of h(≺α) and bounding:
A = Pr
[
p < min
⋃
βα
h(Gβ) ∧ (∀α)Gα d-bounded | h(≺α)
]
If for some β, |Rβ(α)| < |Gβ|/d, it means not all groups are d-bounded, so A = 0. If all groups are
d-bounded and we finished fixing all position-characters, A = 1. These form the base cases of our
induction.
The remainder of the proof is the inductive step. We first break the probability into:
A1·A2 = Pr
[
p < minh(Gα) | h(≺α)
]·Pr [ ⋃
βα
h(Gβ) ∧ (∀α)Gα d-bounded | h(≺α), p > minh(Gα)
]
As h(α) is uniformly random, each representative in Rα has a probability of p of landing below
p. These events are disjoint because p is in the minimum bin, so A1 = 1− p · |Rα| ≤ (1− p)|Rα|.
After using Rα, we are left with rˆ = r − |Rα| =
∑
βα |Rβ(α)| representatives. After h(α) is
chosen, some of the representative of rˆ are lost. Define the random variable ∆ =
∑
βα
(|Rβ(α)| −
|Rβ(α+)|
)
to measure this loss.
Let ∆max ≥ rˆ− n(α)d be a value to be determined. We only need to consider ∆ ≤ ∆max. Indeed,
if more than ∆max representatives are lost, we are left with less than n(α)/d representatives, so
some group is not d-bounded, and the probability is zero. We can now bound A2 by the induction
hypothesis:
A2 ≤
∆max∑
δ=0
Pr[∆ = δ | h(≺α), p > minh(Gα)
] · P (α+, p, rˆ − δ)
where we had P (α+, p, rˆ − δ) = (1− p)rˆ−δ + (1− p)n(α)/(2d) ·
∑
βα
4C(β) · (`/n)
n(β)/d .
Observe that the second term of P (α+, p, rˆ − δ) does not depend on δ so:
A2 ≤ A3 + (1− p)n(α)/(2d) ·
∑
βα
4C(β) · (`/n)
n(β)/d
where A3 =
∆max∑
δ=0
Pr[∆ = δ | h(≺α), p > minh(Gα)
] · (1− p)rˆ−δ.
It remains to bound A3. We observe that (1−p)rˆ−δ is convex in δ, so its achieves the maximum
value if all the probability mass of ∆ is on 0 and ∆max, subject to preserving the mean.
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Observation 24. We have: E[∆ | h(≺α), p > minh(Gα)] ≤ 2 · C(α) · `n .
Proof. As discussed earlier, a representative disappears when we have a pair x, y ∈ Rβ(α) that lands
in the same bin due to h(α). This can only happen if (x, y) is counted in C(α), i.e. α = max≺(x∆y).
If h(α) is uniform, such a pair (x, y) collides with probability `n , regardless of h(≺α). By linearity
of expectation E[∆ | h(≺α)] ≤ C(α) · `n .
However, we have to condition on the event p > minh(Gα), which makes h(α) non-uniform.
Since p < `n and |Gα| ≤ n1−1/c, we have Pr[p < minh(Gα)] < 1/2. Therefore, conditioning on this
event can at most double the expectation of positive random variables.
A bound on A3 can be obtained by assuming Pr[∆ = ∆
max] =
(
2 ·C(α) · `n
)/
∆max, and all the
rest of the mass is on ∆ = 0. This gives:
A3 ≤ (1− p)rˆ + 2 · C(α) · (`/n)
∆max
· (1− p)rˆ−∆max
Remember that we promised to choose ∆max ≥ rˆ − n(α)d . We now fix ∆max = rˆ − n(α)2d . We are
guaranteed that rˆ ≥ n(α)d , since otherwise some group is not d-bounded. This means ∆max ≥ n(α)2d .
We have obtained a bound on A3:
A3 ≤ (1− p)rˆ + 2 · C(α) · (`/n)
n(α)/(2d) · (1− p)
n(α)/(2d)
=⇒ A2 ≤ (1− p)rˆ + (1− p)n(α)/(2d) ·
∑
βα
4C(β) · (`/n)
n(β)/d
=⇒ A ≤ (1− p)|Rα| · (1− p)r−|Rα| + (1− p)n(α)/(2d) ·
∑
βα
4C(β) · (`/n)
n(β)/d
This completes the proof of Lemma 22, and the bound on minwise independence.
6 Fourth Moment Bounds
Consider distributing a set S of n balls into m bins truly randomly. For the sake of generality, let
each element have a weight of wi. We designate a query ball q /∈ S, and let W be the total weight of
the elements landing in bin F (h(q)), where F is an arbitrary function. With µ = E[W ] = 1m
∑
wi,
we are interested in the 4th moment of the bin size: E[(W − µ)4].
Let Xi be the indicator that ball i ∈ S lands in bin F (h(q)), and let Yi = Xi − 1m . We can
rewrite W − µ = ∑i Yiwi, so:
E[(W − µ)4] =
∑
i,j,k,l∈S
wiwjwkwl ·E[YiYjYkYl]. (19)
The terms in which some element appears exactly once are zero. Indeed, if i /∈ {j, k, l}, then
E[YiYjYkYl] = E[Yi] · E[YjYkYl], which is zero since E[Yi] = 0. Thus, the only nonzero terms arise
from:
• four copies of one element (i = j = k = l), giving the term ( 1m ±O( 1m2 ))w4i .
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• two distinct elements s 6= t, each appearing twice. There are (42) = 6 terms for each s, t pair,
and each term is O( 1
m2
)w2sw
2
t .
This gives the standard 4th moment bound:
E
[
(W − µ)4] = 1
m
∑
i
w4i +
O(1)
m2
(∑
i
w2i
)2
. (20)
This bound holds even if balls are distributed by 5-independent hashing: the balls in any 4-
tuple hit the bin chosen by h(q) independently at random. On the other hand, with 4-independent
hashing, this bound can fail quite badly [PT10].
If the distribution of balls into bins is achieved by simple tabulation, we will show a slightly
weaker version of (20):
E
[
(W − µ)4] = 1
m
∑
i
w4i +O
(
1
m2
+
4c
m3
)
·
(∑
i
w2i
)2
. (21)
In §6.1, we show how to analyze the 4th moment of a fixed bin (which requires 4-independence
by standard techniques). Our proof is a combinatorial reduction to Cauchy–Schwarz. In §6.2, we
let the bin depend on the hash code h(q). This requires 5-independence by standard techniques.
To handle tabulation hashing, §6.3 shows a surprising result: among any 5 keys, at least one hashes
independently of the rest.
We note that the bound on the 4th moment of a fixed bin has been indendently discovered
by [BCL+10] in a different context. However, that work is not concerned with a query-dependent
bin, which is the most surprising part of our proof.
6.1 Fourth Moment of a Fixed Bin
We now attempt to bound the terms of (19) in the case of simple tabulation. Since simple tabulation
is 3-independent [WC81], any terms that involve only 3 distinct keys (i.e. |{i, j, k, l}| ≤ 3) have the
same expected value as established above. Thus, we can bound:
E[(W − µ)4] = 1
m
∑
i
w4i +
O(1)
m2
(∑
i
w2i
)2
+
∑
i 6=j 6=k 6=l
wiwjwkwl ·E[YiYjYkYl].
Unlike the case of 4-independence, the contribution from distinct i, j, k, l will not be zero. We begin
with the following simple bound on each term:
Claim 25. For distinct i, j, k, l, E[YiYjYkYl] = O(
1
m3
).
Proof. We are looking at the expectation of Z = (Xi − 1m)(Xj − 1m)(Xk − 1m)(Xl − 1m). Note that
Z is only positive when an even number of the four X’s are 1:
1. the case Xi = Xj = Xk = Xl = 1 only happens with probability
1
m3
by 3-independence. The
contribution to Z is (1− 1m)4 < 1.
2. the case of two 1’s and two 0’s happens with probability at most
(
4
2
)
1
m2
, and contributes
1
m2
(1− 1m)2 < 1m2 to Z.
3. the case of Xi = Xj = Xk = Xl = 0 contributes
1
m4
to Z.
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Thus, the first case dominates and E[Z] = O( 1
m3
).
If one of {i, j, k, l} contains a unique position-character, its hash code is independent of the
other three. In this case, the term is zero, as the independent key factors out of the expectation
and E[Yi] = 0. We are left with analyzing 4-tuples with no unique position-characters; let A ⊆ S4
contain all such 4-tuples. Then:∑
i 6=j 6=k 6=l
wiwjwkwl ·E[YiYjYkYl] = O
(
1
m3
) · ∑
(i,j,k,l)∈A
wiwjwkwl.
Imagine representing a tuple from A as a 4 × q matrix, with every key represented in a row.
There are four types of columns that we may see: columns that contain a single character in all
rows (type 1), and columns that contain two distinct characters, each appearing in two rows (type
j ∈ {2, 3, 4} means that row j has the same character as row 1). According to this classification,
there are 4q possible matrix types.
Claim 26. Fix a fixed matrix type, and let B ⊆ A contain all tuples conforming to this type. Then,∑
(i,j,k,l)∈B wiwjwkwl ≤
(∑
iw
2
i
)2
.
Proof. We first group keys according to their projection on the type-1 characters. We obtain a
partition of the keys S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · such that St contains keys that are identical in the type-1
coordinates. Tuples that conform to the fixed matrix type, (i, j, k, l) ∈ B, must consist of four keys
from the same set, i.e. i, j, k, l ∈ St. Below, we analyze each St separately and bound the tuples
from (St)
4 by
(∑
i∈St w
2
i
)2
. This implies the lemma by convexity, as
∑
t
(∑
i∈St w
2
i
)2 ≤ (∑iw2i )2.
For the remainder, fix some St. If |St| < 4, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, there must
exist at least one character of type different from 1, differentiating the keys. By permuting the set
{i, j, k, l}, we may assume a type-2 character exists. Group keys according to their projection on
all type-2 characters. We obtain a partition of the keys St = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ · · · such that Ta contains
keys that are identical in the type-2 coordinates.
A type-conforming tuple (i, j, k, l) ∈ B must satisfy i, j ∈ Ta and k, l ∈ Tb for a 6= b. We claim
a stronger property: for any i, j ∈ Ta and every b 6= a, there exists at most one pair k, l ∈ Tb
completing a valid tuple (i, j, k, l) ∈ B. Indeed, for type-1 coordinates, k and l must be identical to
i on that coordinate. For type 3 and 4 coordinates, k and l must reuse the characters from i and j
(k ← i, l← j for type 3; k ← j, l← i for type 4).
Let X ⊂ (Ta)2 contain the pairs i, j ∈ Ta which can be completed by one pair k, l ∈ Tb. Let
Y ⊂ (Tb)2 contain the pairs k, l ∈ Tb which can be completed by i, j ∈ Ta. There is a bijection
between X and Y ; let it be f : X 7→ Y . We can now apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:∑
(i,j,k,l)∈B ∩ (Ta×Tb)
wiwjwkwl =
∑
(i,j)∈X, (k,l)=f(i,j)
(wiwj) · (wkwl)
≤
√√√√√
 ∑
(i,j)∈X
(wiwj)2
 ∑
(k,l)∈Y
(wkwl)2

But
∑
(i,j)∈X w
2
iw
2
j ≤
(∑
i∈Ta w
2
i
)2
. Thus, the equation is further bounded by(∑
i∈Ta w
2
i
)(∑
k∈Tb w
2
k
)
.
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Summing up over all Ta and Tb, we obtain:
∑
(i,j,k,l)∈B∩(St)4
wiwjwkwl ≤
∑
a,b
(∑
i∈Ta
w2i
)∑
k∈Tb
w2k
 ≤ (∑
i∈St
w2i
)2
This completes the proof of the claim.
The bound of Claim 26 is multiplied by 4q, the number of matrix types. We have thus shown
(21).
6.2 Fourth Moment of a Query-Dependent Bin
We now aim to bound the 4th moment of a bin chosen as a function F of h(q), where q is a designated
query ball. This requires dealing with 5 keys (i, j, k, l and the query q). Even though simple
tabulation is only 3-independent, we will prove the following intriguing independence guarantee in
§6.3:
Theorem 27. With simple tabulation, in any fixed set of 5 distinct keys, there is a key whose hash
is independent of the other 4 hash codes.
As a side note, we observe that this theorem essentially implies that any 4-independent tabula-
tion based scheme is also 5-independent. In particular, this immediately shows the 5-independence
of the scheme from [TZ04] (which augments simple tabulation with some derived characters). This
fact was already known [TZ09], albeit with a more complicated proof.
In the remainder of this section, we use Theorem 27 to derive the 4th moment bound (21). As
before, we want to bound terms wiwjwkwl ·E[YiYjYkYl] for all possible configurations of (i, j, k, l).
Remember that q /∈ S, so q /∈ {i, j, k, l}. These terms can fall in one of the following cases:
• All keys are distinct, and q hashes independently. Then, the contribution of i, j, k, l to bin
F (h(q)) bin is the same as to any fixed bin.
• All keys are distinct, and q is dependent. Then, at least one of {i, j, k, l} must be independent
of the rest and q; say it is i. But then we can factor i out of the product: E[YiYjYkYl] =
E[Yi] ·E[YjYkYl]. The term is thus zero, since E[Yi] = 0.
• Three distinct keys, ∣∣{i, j, k, l}∣∣ = 3. This case is analyzed below.
• One or two distinct keys: ∣∣{i, j, k, l}∣∣ ≤ 2. By 3-independence of simple tabulation, all hash
codes are independent, so the contribution of this term is the same as in the case of a fixed
bin.
To summarize, the 4th moment of bin F (h(q)) is the same as the 4th moment of a fixed bin,
plus an additional term due to the case
∣∣{i, j, k, l}∣∣ = 3. The remaining challenge is to understand
terms of the form w2iwjwkE
[
Y 2i YjYk
]
. We first prove the following, which is similar to Claim 25:
Claim 28. For distinct i, j, k, E[Y 2i YjYk] = O(
1
m2
).
Proof. By 3-independence of simple tabulation, Yi and Yj are independent (these involve looking
at the hashes of i, j, q). For an upper bound, we can ignore all outcomes Y 2i YjYk < 0, i.e. when Yj
and Yk have different signs. On the one hand, Yj = Yk = 1 − 1m with probability O( 1m2 ). On the
other hand, if Yj = Yk = − 1m , the contribution to the expectation is O( 1m2 ).
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Assume wj ≥ wk by symmetry. If k hashes independently of {i, j, q}, the term is zero, since
E[Yk] = 0 can be factored out. Otherwise, the term contributes O(w
2
iw
2
j/m
2) to the sum.
Claim 29. For any distinct i, j, q, there is a unique key k such that h(k) depends on h(i), h(j), h(k).
Proof. We claim that if any of {i, j, k, q} has a unique position-character, all keys are independent.
Indeed, the key with a unique position-character is independent of the rest, which are independent
among themselves by 3-independence.
Thus, any set {i, j, q} that allows for a dependent k cannot have 3 distinct position-characters on
one position. In any position where i, j, and q conincide, k must also share that position-character.
If i, j, and q contain two distinct distinct characters on some positon, k must contain the one that
appears once. This determines k.
For any i and j, we see exactly one set {i, j, k} that leads to bad tuples. By an infinitesimal
perturbation of the weights, each such set leads to
(
4
2
)
= 6 tuples: we have to choose two positions
for i, and then j is the remaining key with larger weight. Thus, the total contribution of all terms
(i, j, k, l) with 3 distinct keys is O
(∑
i,j
w2iw
2
j
m2
)
= O( 1
m2
)(
∑
iw
2
i )
2. This completes the proof of (21).
6.3 Independence Among Five Keys
The section is dedicated to proving Theorem 27. We first observe the following immediate fact:
Fact 30. If, restricting to a subset of the characters (matrix columns), a key x ∈ X hashes inde-
pendently from X \ {x}, then it also hashes independently when considering all characters.
If some key contains a unique character, we are done by peeling. Otherwise, each column
contains either a single value in all five rows, or two distinct values: one appearing in two rows,
and one in three rows. By Fact 30, we may ignore the columns containing a single value. For
the columns containing two values, relabel the value appearing three times with 0, and the one
appearing twice with 1. By Fact 30 again, we may discard any duplicate column, leaving at most(
5
2
)
distinct columns.
Since the columns have weight 2, the Hamming distance between two columns is either 2 or 4.
Lemma 31. If two columns have Hamming distance 4, one hash value is independent.
Proof. By Fact 30, we ignore all other columns. Up to reordering of the rows, the matrix is:

0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
1 1
 .
By 3-independence of character hashing, keys 1, 3, and 5 are independent. But keys 2 and 4 are
identical to keys 1 and 3. Thus, key 5 is independent from the rest.
We are left with the case where all column pairs have Hamming distance 2. By reordering of
the rows, the two columns look like the matrix in (a) below. Then, there exist only two column
vectors that are at distance two from both of the columns in (a):
(a)

0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
1 1
 (b)

0
1
1
0
1
 (c)

1
0
0
1
1

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If the matrix does not contain column (b), then keys 4 and 5 are identical, a contradiction.
Thus, the matrix must contain columns (a) and (b), with (c) being optional. If (c) appears, discard
it by Fact 30. We are left with the matrix:

0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1

Now, observe that the hash code of row 1 is just the xor of the hash codes of rows 2–4,
h(1) = h(2) ⊕ hC(3) ⊕ hC(4). Indeed, the codes of the one characters in each column cancel
out, leaving us with an xor of the zeros in each column. We claim that row 5 is independent of
rows 2–4. This immediately implies that row 5 is independent of all others, since row 1 is just a
function of rows 2–4.
Independence of row 5 from rows 2–4 follows by peeling. Each of rows 2, 3, and 4 have a position
character not present in 5, so they are independent of 5. This completes the proof of Theorem 27.
6.4 Linear Probing with Fourth Moment Bounds
As in Section 3 we study linear probing with n stored keys in a table of size m, and a query q not
among the stored keys. We define the fill α = n/m and ε = 1− α. Pagh et al. [PPR09] presented
a proof that with 5-independent hashing, the expected number probes is O(1/ε13/6). We will here
improve this to the optimal O(1/ε2), which is optimal even for a fully random hash function. For
the case of smaller fill, where α ≤ 1/2, Thorup [Tho09] proved that the expected number of filled
entries probes is O(α) which is optimal even for fully random functions.
As discussed in Section 3, our goal is to study the length L of the longest filled interval containing
a point p which may depend on h(q), e.g., p = h(q). To bound the probability that an interval I is
full, we study more generally the case how the number XI of keys hashed to I deviates from the
mean α|I|: if I is full, the deviation is by more than εα|I|.
As we mentioned earlier, as an initial step Pagh et al. [PPR09] proved that if we consider the
number of keys XI in an interval I which may depend on the hash of a query key, then we have
the following 4th unweighted moment bound:
Pr[XI ≥ ∆ + α|I|] = O
(
α|I|+ (α|I|)2
∆4
)
(22)
This is an unweighted version of (21) so (22) holds both with 5-independent hashing and with
simple tabulation hashing.
As with our simple tabulation hashing, for each i, we consider the event Ci,δ,p that for some point
p that may depend on the hash of the query key, there is some an interval I 3 p, 2i ≤ |I| < 2i+1
with relative deviation δ. In perfect generalization of (22), we will show that (22) implies
Pr[Ci,δ,p] = O
(
α2i + (α2i)2
(δα2i)4
)
(23)
First consider the simple case where δ ≥ 1. We apply Claim 9. Since δ ≥ 1, we get j = i − 3.
The event Ci,δ,p implies that one of the 25 + 1 relevant j-bins has (1 + δ2)α2j keys. By (22), the
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probability of this event is bounded by
(25 + 1)O
(
α2j + (α2j)2
( δ2α2
j)4
)
= O
(
α2i + (α2i)2
(δα2i)4
)
.
This completes the proof of (23) when δ ≥ 1.
Now consider the case where δ ≤ 1. If α2i ≤ 1, (23) does not give a probability bound below 1,
so we can assume α2i > 1. Then (23) simplifies to
Pr[Ci,δ,p] = O(1/(δ4(α2i)2) (24)
This time we will apply Claim 10. Recall that a j-bin is dangerous for level i if its absolute deviation
is ∆j,i =
δα2i
24 /2
(i−j)/5. We defined j0 be the smallest non-negative integer satisfying ∆j0,i ≤ α2j0 .
If Ci,δ,p happens, then for some j ∈ {j0, ..., i}, one of the 2i−j+2 + 1 relevant j-bins is dangerous for
level i. By (22), the probability of this event is bounded by
∑i
j=j0
O(Pj) where
Pj = 2
i−j α2j + (α2j)2
∆4i,j
= O
(
2i−j
α2j + (α2j)2(
δα2i/2(i−j)/5
)4
)
Let j1 = dlog2(1/α)e. Note that j1 ≤ i. For j ≥ j1, we have α2j + (α2j)2 = O((α2j)2), so
Pj = O
(
2i−j
(α2j)2(
δα2i/2(i−j)/5
)4
)
= O
(
1
δ4(α2i)22
1
5
(i−j)
)
.
We see that for j ≥ j1, the bound decreases exponentially with j, so
i∑
j=j1
Pj = O
(
1/(δ4(α2i)2)
)
. (25)
This is the desired bound from (24) for Pr[Ci,δ,p], so we are done if j1 ≤ j0. However, suppose
j0 < j1. By definition, we have α2
j1 ≤ 1 and ∆i,j1 ≤ 1, so
Pj1 = 2
i−j1 α2
j1 + (α2j1)2
∆4i,j1
= Ω(1).
This means that there is nothing to prove, for with (25), we conclude that
(
1/(δ4(α2i)2)
)
= Ω(1).
Therefore (24) does not promise any probability below 1. This completes the proof of (23). As in
Theorem 8, we can consider the more general event D`,δ,p that there exists an interval I containing
p and of length at least ` such that the number of keys XI in I deviates at least δ from the mean.
Then, as a perfect generalization of (23), we get
Pr[D`,δ,p] =
∑
i≥log2 `
Ci,δ,p =
∑
i≥log2 `
O
(
α2i + (α2i)2
(δα2i)4
)
= O
(
α`+ (α`)2
(δα`)4
)
(26)
In the case of linear probing with fill α = 1−ε, we worry about filled intervals. Let L be the length
of the longest full interval containing the hash of a query key. For ε ≤ 1/2 and α ≥ 1/2, we use
δ = ε and
Pr[D`,ε,p] = O(1/(`2ε4))
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so
E[L] ≤
m∑
`=1
Pr[D`,ε,p] =
m∑
`=1
min
{
1, O(1/(`2ε4))
}
= O(1/ε2),
improving the O(1/ε
13
6 ) bound from [PPR09]. However, contrasting the bounds with simple tab-
ulation, the concentration from (26) does not work well for higher moments, e.g., the variance
bound we get with ε = 1/2 is O(log n), and for larger moment p ≥ 3, we only get a bound of
O(np/(n2)) = O(np−2).
Now consider α ≤ 1/2. We use δ = 1/(2α) noting that (1 + δ)α|I| = (α+ 1/2)|I| < |I|. Then
Pr[D`,1/(2α),p] = O
(
α`+ (α`)2
`4
)
In particular, as promised in (15), we have
Pr[L > 0] = Pr[D1,1/(2α),p] = O(α+ α2) = O(α)
More generally for the mean,
E[L] ≤
m∑
`=1
Pr[D`,1/(2α),p]
=
m∑
`=1
O
(
α`+ (α`)2
`4
)
= O(α).
This reproves the bound from Thorup [Tho09].
A Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we make some simple experiments comparing simple tabulation with other hashing
schemes, both on their own, and in applications. Most of our experiments are the same as those
in [TZ09] except that we here include simple tabulation whose relevance was not realized in [TZ09].
We will also consider Cuckoo hashing which was not considered in [TZ09].
Recall the basic message of our paper that simple tabulation in applications shares many of
the strong mathematical properties normally associated with an independence of at least 5. For
example, when used in linear probing, the expected number of probes is constant for any set of input
keys. With sufficiently random input, this expected constant is obtained by any universal hashing
scheme [MV08], but other simple schemes fail on simple structured inputs like dense intervals or
arithmetic progressions, which could easily occur in practice [TZ09].
Our experiments consider two issues:
• How fast is simple tabulation compared with other realistic hashing schemes on random input?
In this case, the quality of the hash function doesn’t matter, and we are only comparing their
speed.
• What happens to the quality on structured input. We consider the case of dense intervals,
and also the hypercube which we believe should be the worst input for simple tabulation since
it involves the least amount of randomness.
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We will now briefly review the hashing schemes considered in our experiments. The focus will
be on the common cases of 32 and 64 bit keys. If the initial keys are much bigger, we can typically
first apply universal hashing to get down to a smaller domain, e.g., collision free down to a domain
of size n2. To achieve expected O(1) time for linear probing, it suffices to map universally to a
domain of just O(n) [Tho09].
A.1 Multiplication-shift Hashing
The fastest known hashing schemes are based on a multiplication followed by a shift.
Univ-mult-shift. If we are satisfied with plain universal hashing, then as shown in [DHKP97],
we pick a random odd number a from the same `-bit domain as the keys. If the desired output is
`out-bit keys, we compute the universal hash function:
ha(x) = (a*x)>>(`− `out).
This expression should be interpreted according to the C programming language. In particular, *
denotes standard computer multiplication where the result is truncated to the same size as that of
its largest operand. Here this means multiplication modulo 2`. Also, >> is a right shift taking out
least significant bits. Mathematically, this is integer division by 2`−`out . Note that this scheme is
far from 2-independent, e.g., if two keys differ in only their least significant bit, then so does their
hash values. However, the scheme is universal which suffices, say, for expected constant times in
chaining.
2-indep-mult-shift. For 2-independent hashing, we use the scheme from [Die96]. We pick a
random 2`-bit multiplier a (which does not need to be odd), and a 2` bit number b. Now we
compute:
ha,b(x) = (a*x+b)>>(2`− `out).
This works fine with a single 64-bit multiplication when ` = 32. For ` = 64, we would need to
simulate 128-bit multiplication. In this case, we have a faster alternative used for string hashing
[Tho09], viewing the key x as consisting of two 32-bit keys x1 and x2. For a 2-independent 32-bit
output, we pick three random 64-bit numbers a1 and a2 and b, and compute
ha1,a2,b(x1x2) = ((a1+x2)*(a2+x1)+b)>>32.
Concatenating two such values, we get a 64-bit 2-independent hash value using just two 64-bit
multiplications.
A.2 Polynomial Hashing
For general k-independent hashing, we have the classic implementation of Carter and Wegman
[WC81] by a degree k − 1 polynomial over some prime field:
h(x) =
(
k−1∑
i=0
aix
i mod p
)
mod 2`out (27)
for some prime p  2`out with each ai picked randomly from [p]. If p is an arbitrary prime, this
method is fairly slow because ‘mod p’ is slow. However, Carter and Wegman [CW79] pointed out
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that we can get a fast implementation using shifts and bitwise Boolean operations if p is a so-called
Mersenne prime of the form 2i − 1.
5-indep-Mersenne-prime. We use the above scheme for 5-independent hashing. For 32-bit keys,
we use p = 261 − 1, and for 64-bit keys, we use p = 289 − 1.
For the practical implementation, recall that standard 64-bit multiplication on computers dis-
cards overflow beyond the 64 bits. For example, this implies that we may need four 64-bit multipli-
cations just to implement a full multiplication of two numbers from [261−1]. This is why specialized
2-independent schemes are much faster. Unfortunately, we do not know a practical generalization
for higher independence.
A.3 Tabulation-Based Hashing
The basic idea in tabulation based schemes is to replace multiplications with lookups in tables that
are small enough to fit in fast memory.
simple-table. Simple tabulation is the basic example of tabulation based hashing. A key x =
x1 · · ·xc is divided into c characters. For i = 1 . . c, we have a table Ti providing a random value Ti[xi]
with a random value, and then we just return the xor of all the Ti[xi]. Since the tables are small, it
is easy to populate them with random data (e.g. based on atmospheric noise http://random.org).
Simple tabulation is only 3-independent.
We are free to chose the size of the character domain, e.g., we could use 16-bit characters
instead of 8-bit characters, but then the tables would not fit in the fast L1 cache. The experiments
from [TZ09] indicate that 8-bit characters give much better performance, and that is what we use
here.
5-indep-TZ-table. To get higher independence, we can compute some additional “derived char-
acters” and use them to index into new tables, like the regular characters. Thorup and Zhang
[TZ04,TZ09] presented a fast such scheme for 5-independent hashing. With c = 2 characters, they
simply use the derived character x1 + x2. For c > 2, this generalizes with c− 1 derived characters
and a total of 2c − 1 lookups for 5-independent hashing. The scheme is rather complicated to
implement, but runs well.
A.4 Hashing in Isolation
Our first goal is to time the different hashing schemes when run in isolation. We want to know
how simple tabulation compares in speed to the fast multiplication-shift schemes and to the 5-
independent schemes whose qualities it shares. We compile and run the same C code on two
different computers:
32-bit computer: Single-core Intel Xeon 3.2 GHz 32-bit processor with 2048KB cache, 32-bit
addresses and libraries.
64-bit computer: Dual-core Intel Xeon 2.6 GHz 64-bit processor with 4096KB cache, 64-bit
addresses and libraries.
Table 1 presents the timings for the different hashing schemes, first mapping 32-bit keys to 32-
bit values, second mapping 64-bit keys to 64-bit values. Not surprisingly, we see that the 64-bit
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Hashing random keys 32-bit computer 64-bit computer
bits hashing scheme hashing time (ns)
32 univ-mult-shift 1.87 2.33
32 2-indep-mult-shift 5.78 2.88
32 5-indep-Mersenne-prime 99.70 45.06
32 5-indep-TZ-table 10.12 12.66
32 simple-table 4.98 4.61
64 univ-mult-shift 7.05 3.14
64 2-indep-mult-shift 22.91 5.90
64 5-indep-Mersenne-prime 241.99 68.67
64 5-indep-TZ-table 75.81 59.84
64 simple-table 15.54 11.40
Table 1: Average time per hash computation for 10 million hash computations.
computer benefits more than the 32-bit computer when 64-bit multiplications is critical; namely in
univ-mult-shift for 64 bits, 2-indep-mult-shift, and 5-indep-Mersenne-prime.
As mentioned, the essential difference between our experiments and those in [TZ09] is that
simple tabulation is included, and our interest here is how it performs relative to the other schemes.
In the case of 32-bits keys, we see that in both computers, the performance of simple tabulation
is similar to 2-indep-mult-shift. Also, not surprisingly, we see that it is more than twice as fast as
the much more complicated 5-indep-TZ-table.
When we go to 64-bits, it may be a bit surprising that simple tabulation becomes more than
twice as slow, for we do exactly twice as many look-ups. However, the space is quadrupled with
twice as many tables, each with twice as big entries, moving up from 1KB to 8KB, so the number
of cache misses may increase.
Comparing simple tabulation with the 2-indep-mult-shift, we see that it is faster on the 32-bit
computer and less than twice as slow on the 64-bit computer. We thus view it as competitive in
speed.
The competitiveness of simple tabulation compared with multiplication-shift based methods
agrees with the experiments of Thorup [Tho00] from more than 10 years ago on older computer
architectures. The experiments from [Tho00] did not include schemes of higher independence.
The competitiveness of our cache based simple tabulation with multiplication-shift based meth-
ods is to be expected both now and in the future. One can always imagine that multiplication
becomes faster than multiplication, and vice versa. However, most data processing involves fre-
quent cache and memory access. Therefore, even if it was technically possible, it would normally
wasteful to configure a computer with much faster multiplication than cache. Conversely, how-
ever, there is lot of data processing that does not use multiplication, so it is easier to imagine real
computers configured with faster cache than multiplication.
Concerning hardware, we note that simple tabulation is ideally suited for parallel lookups of
the characters of a key. Also, the random data in the character tables are only changed rarely in
connection with a rehash. Otherwise we only read the tables, which means that we could potentially
have them stored in simpler and faster EEPROM or flash memory. This would also avoid conflicts
with other applications in cache.
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Linear probing with random keys 32-bit computer 64-bit computer
hashing scheme update time (nanoseconds)
univ-mult-shift 141 149
2-indep-mult-shift 151 157
5-indep-Mersenne-prime 289 245
5-indep-TZ-table 177 211
simple-table 149 166
Table 2: Linear probing with random 32-bit keys. The time is averaged over 10 million updates to
set with 1 million keys in linear probing table with 2 million entries.
A.5 Linear Probing
We now consider what happens when we use the different hashing schemes with linear probing.
In this case, the hash function needs good random properties are need for good performance on
worst-case input. We consider 220 32-bit keys in a table with 221 entries. The table therefore uses
8MB space, which does not fit in the cache of either computer, so there will be competition for the
cache. Each experiment averaged the update time over 10 million insert/delete cycles. For each
input type, we ran 100 such experiments on the same input but with different random seeds for
the hash functions.
Random input. First we consider the case of a random input, where the randomization properties
of the hash function are irrelevant. This means that the focus is on speed just like when we ran
the experiments in isolation. Essentially, the cost per update should be that of computing the hash
value, as in Table 1, plus a common additive cost: a random access to look up the hash entry plus
a number of sequential probes. The average number of probes per update was tightly concentrated
around 3.28 for all schemes, deviating by less than 0.02 over the 100 experiments.
An interesting new issue is that the different schemes now have to compete with the linear
probing table for the cache. In particular, this could hurt the tabulation based schemes. Another
issue is that when schemes are integrated with an application, the optimizing compiler may have
many more opportunities for pipelining etc. The results for random input are presented in Table
2. Within the 100 experiments, the deviation for each data point was less than 1%, and here we
just present the mean.
Compared with Table 1, we see that our 32-bit computer performs better than the 64-bit
computer on linear probing. In Table 1 we had that the 64-bit processor was twice as fast at
the hash computations based on 64-bit multiplication, but in Table 2, when combined with linear
probing, we see that it is only faster in the most extreme case of 5-indep-Mersenne-prime. One
of the more surprising outcomes is that 5-indep-Mersenne-prime is so slow compared with the
tabulation based schemes on the 64-bit computer. We had expected the tabulation based schemes
to take a hit from cache competition, but the effect appears to be minor.
The basic outcome is that simple tabulation in linear probing with random input is competitive
with the fast multiplication-shift based scheme and about 20% faster than the fastest 5-independent
scheme (which is much more complicated to implement). We note that we cannot hope for a big
multiplicative gain in this case, since the cost is dominated by the common additive cost from
working the linear probing table itself.
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Structured input. We now consider the case where the input keys are structured in the sense of
being drawn in random order from a dense interval: a commonly occurring case in practice which
is known to cause unreliable performance for most simple hashing schemes [PPR09, PT10, TZ09].
The results are shown in Figure 2. For each hashing scheme, we present the average number of
probes for each of the 100 experiments as a cumulative distribution function. We see that simple
tabulation and the 5-independent schemes remain tightly concentrated while the multiplication-
shift schemes have significant variance, as observed also in [TZ09]. This behavior is repeated in the
timings on the two computers, but shifted due to difference in speed for the hash computations.
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Figure 2: Keys from dense interval. The multiplication-shift schemes sometimes use far more
probes, which also shows in much longer running times.
Thus, among simple fast hashing schemes, simple tabulation stands out in not failing on a dense
interval. Of course, it might be that simple tabulation had a different worst-case input. A plausible
guess is that the worst instance of simple tabulation is the hypercube, which minimizes the amount
of random table entries used. In our case, for 220 keys, we experimented with the set [32]4, i.e., we
only use 32 values for each of the 4 characters. The results for the number of probes are presented
in Figure 3.
Thus, simple tabulation remains extremely robust and tightly concentrated, but once again the
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Figure 3: Keys from hyper cube.
multiplication-shift schemes fail (this time more often but less badly). The theoretical explanation
from [PT10] is that multiplication-shift fails on arithmetic sequences, and in the hypercube we have
many different but shorter arithmetic sequences. It should be said that although it cannot be seen
in the plots, the structured inputs did lead to more deviation in probes for simple tabulation: the
deviation from 3.28 over 100 independent runs grew from below 0.5% with random input to almost
1% with any of the structured input.
Obviously, no experiment can confirm that simple tabulation is robust for all possible inputs.
Our theoretical analysis implies strong concentration, e.g., in the sense of constant variance, yet the
hidden constants are large. Our experiments suggest that the true constants are very reasonable.
Cuckoo hashing. Our results show that the failure probability in constructing a cuckoo hashing
table is O(n−1/3). A pertinent question is whether the constants hidden by the O-notation are too
high from a practical point of view. Experiments cannot conclusively prove that this constant is
always small, since we do not know the worst instance. However, as for linear probing, a plausible
guess that the instance eliciting the worst behavior is a hypercube: S = Ac, for A ⊂ Σ. We made
105 independent runs with the following input instances:
32-bit keys: Tabulation uses c = 4 characters. We set A = [32], giving 324 = 220 keys in S. The
empirical success probability was 99.4%.
64-bit keys: Tabulation uses c = 8 characters. We set A = 8, giving 88 = 224 keys in S. The
empirical success probability was 97.1%.
These experiments justify the belief that our scheme is effective in practice.
It has already been shown conclusively that weaker multiplication schemes do not perform
well. Dietzfelbinger and Schellbach [DS09] show analytically that, when S is chosen uniformly at
random from the universe [n12/11] or smaller, cuckoo hashing with 2-independent multiplicative
hashing fails with probability 1− o(1). This is borne out in the experiments of [DS09], which give
failure probability close to 1 for random sets that are dense in the universe. On the other hand,
the more complicated tabulation hashing of Thorup and Zhang [TZ04] will perform at least as well
as simple tabulation (that algorithm is a superset of simple tabulation).
A notable competitor to simple tabulation is a tailor-made tabulation hash function analyzed by
Dietzfelbinger and Woelfel [DW03]. This function uses two arrays of size r and four d-independent
hash functions to obtain failure probability n/rd/2.
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Let us analyze the parameters needed in a practical implementation. If we want the same space
as in simple tabulation, we can set r = 210 (this is larger than Σ = 256, because fewer tables are
needed). For a nontrivial failure probability with sets of 220 keys, this would require 6-independence.
In principle, the tabulation-based scheme of [TZ04] can support 6-independence with 5c− 4 tables
(and lookups). This scheme has not been implemented yet, but based on combinatorial complexity
is expected to be at least twice as slow as the 5-independent scheme tested in Table 1 (i.e. 4-8 times
slower than simple tabulation). Alternatively, we can compute four 6-independent hash functions
using two polynomials of degree 5 on 64-bit values (e.g. modulo 261 − 1). Based on Table 1, this
would be two orders of magnitude slower than simple tabulation. With any of the alternatives, the
tailor-made scheme is much more complicated to implement.
B Chernoff Bounds with Fixed Means
We will here formally establish that the standard Chernoff bounds hold if when each variable have
a fixed mean even if the of the variables are not independent. Below shall use the notation that if
we have variables x1, x2, ..., then x<i = {xj}j<i. In particular,
∑
x<i =
∑
j<i xj .
Proposition 32. Consider n possibly dependent random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
for each i that E[Xi] = µi is fixed no matter the values of X1, ..., Xi−1, that is, for any values
x1, ..., xi−1, E[Xi|X<i = x<i] = µi. Let X =
∑
iXi and µ = E[X] =
∑
i µi. Then for any δ > 0,
the bounds are:
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
)µ
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤
(
e−δ
(1− δ)(1−δ)
)µ
Proof. The proof is a simple generalization over the standard proof when the Xi are independent.
We wish to bound the probability of X ≥ (1 + δ)µ. To do this we will prove that
E[(1 + δ)X ] ≤ eµ.
The proof will be by induction on n. Let
E[(1 + δ)X ] =
∑
x<n
〈
Pr[X<n = x<n]×E
[
(1 + δ)X |X<n = x<n
]〉
=
∑
x<n
〈
Pr[X<n = x<n]× (1 + δ)
∑
x<n ×E [(1 + δ)Xn |X<n = x<n]〉 .
Now, for any random variable Y ∈ [0, 1], by convexity,
E
[
(1 + δ)Y
] ≤ E[Y ](1 + δ) + 1−E[Y ] = 1 + δE[Y ] ≤ eδE[Y ]
Therefore, since E[Xn|X<n = x<n] = µn for any value x<n of X<n,
E
[
(1 + δ)Xn |X<n = x<n
] ≤ eδµn .
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Thus
E[(1 + δ)X ] =
∑
x<n
〈
Pr[X<n = x<n]× (1 + δ)
∑
x<n ×E [(1 + δ)Xn |X<n = x<n]〉 .
≤
∑
x<n
〈
Pr[X<n = x<n]× (1 + δ)
∑
x<n × eδµn
〉
= E
[
(1 + δ)
∑
X<n
]
× eδµn
≤ eδ
∑
µ<n × eδµn = eδµ.
The last inequality followed by induction. Finally, by Markov’s inequality, we conclude that
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ E
[
(1 + δ)X
]
(1 + δ)(1+δ)µ
≤ e
δµ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)µ
=
(
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
)µ
.
The case X ≤ (1− δ)µ follows by a symmetric argument.
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